
QUANTUM HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

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(joint work with Yfke Dulek and Florian Speelman)

<http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.09717>



Institute for Logic, Language
and Computation (ILLC)
University of Amsterdam



Research Center for
Quantum Software



Centrum
Wiskunde & Informatica

Trustworthy Quantum Information 2016, Shanghai, China, Wednesday 29 June 2016

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING



EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

SKYLINE




JED




EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING




EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING



EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING



EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING



-
1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
 2. PREVIOUS RESULTS
 3. NEW RESULT
-

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



KEY GENERATION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



KEY GENERATION



public key

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key



ENCRYPTION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key




evaluation key




ENCRYPTION



+



→



HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key




ENCRYPTION
(secure)



+



→



HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key



ENCRYPTION
(secure)



+



→



HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key




ENCRYPTION
(secure)



+



→



HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key




evaluation key




ENCRYPTION
(secure)



+



→



EVALUATION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION



KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key



ENCRYPTION
(secure)




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
→



EVALUATION



+



→



HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




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public key



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evaluation key




ENCRYPTION
(secure)




+




→



EVALUATION



+



→



DECRYPTION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key




ENCRYPTION
(secure)




+




→



EVALUATION



+



→



DECRYPTION



+



→

JED

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key



ENCRYPTION
(secure)




+ x



EVALUATION



+



DECRYPTION



+



f(x)

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key



ENCRYPTION
(secure)



+

$|\psi\rangle$

\mapsto



EVALUATION



+



\mapsto



DECRYPTION



+



\mapsto

$U|\psi\rangle$

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION




KEY GENERATION



public key



secret key



evaluation key (quantum)



ENCRYPTION
(secure)




+

$|\psi\rangle$

\mapsto




EVALUATION



+



\mapsto



DECRYPTION



+



\mapsto

$U|\psi\rangle$

✓ HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

2. PREVIOUS RESULTS

3. NEW RESULT

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

C. Gentry: Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. STOC'09

A. Broadbent, S. Jeffery. Quantum Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits of Low T-gate Complexity. CRYPTO 2015

Y. Ouyang, S-H. Tan, J. Fitzsimons. Quantum homomorphic encryption from quantum codes. [arxiv:1508.00938](https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.00938)



PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

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PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

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- Quantum homomorphic encryption: only partial results
 - Clifford scheme allowing evaluation of $\{P, H, \text{CNOT}\}$
 - schemes for $\{P, H, \text{CNOT}\}$ + limited # of T gates

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SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$

[AMTW00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS'00

[Gentry 09] C. Gentry: Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. STOC'09



SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

[AMTW00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS'00

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SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, \text{CNOT}\}$

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encryption:


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SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$

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[AMTW00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS'00


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SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$

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$|\psi\rangle \mapsto X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle =$ 


[AMTW00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS'00


[Gentry 09] C. Gentry: Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. STOC'09



SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

encryption: pick $a, b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ 

$|\psi\rangle \mapsto X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle =$ 

decryption:


[AMTW00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS'00


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SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

encryption: pick $a, b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ 

$|\psi\rangle \mapsto X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle =$ 

decryption: $X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle \mapsto |\psi\rangle$


[AMTW00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS'00


[Gentry 09] C. Gentry: Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. STOC'09



SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

encryption: pick $a, b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ 

$$|\psi\rangle \mapsto X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle = \text{[box with } |\psi\rangle \text{ and lock with } a,b \text{]} \text{ $$

decryption: $X^a Z^b |\psi\rangle \mapsto |\psi\rangle$

Ingredient 2: classical homomorphic encryption

[AMTW00] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. De Wolf. Private quantum channels. FOCS'00

[Gentry 09] C. Gentry: Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. STOC'09



SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$




SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}


$|\psi\rangle$




SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$





SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$



SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$



SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$



SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$



$$H \left(\boxed{|\psi\rangle} \text{ with lock } a,b \right)$$

=

$$HX^aZ^b|\psi\rangle$$

=

$$X^bZ^aH|\psi\rangle$$



=

$$\boxed{H|\psi\rangle} \text{ with lock } b,a$$




$$\boxed{H|\psi\rangle} \text{ with lock } b,a$$



SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$




SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$






SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, \text{CNOT}\}$





SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, \text{CNOT}\}$






SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$




SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, CNOT\}$



SCHEME FOR $\{P, H, \text{CNOT}\}$




SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE







THE CHALLENGE: T GATE




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE




THE CHALLENGE: T GATE



THE CHALLENGE: T GATE



THE CHALLENGE: T GATE



how to apply correction P^{-1} iff $a = 1$?

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

(comparison based on Stacey Jeffery's slides)

[BJ15] A. Broadbent, S. Jeffery. Quantum Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits of Low T-gate Complexity. CRYPTO 2015

[OTF15] Y. Ouyang, S-H. Tan, J. Fitzsimons. Quantum homomorphic encryption from quantum codes. [arxiv:1508.00938](https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.00938)



PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

	homomorphic for	compactness	security
Not encrypting	Quantum circuits	yes	no
append evaluation description	Quantum circuits	Complexity of Dec prop to (# gates)	yes
Quantum OTP	no	yes	inf theoretic
Clifford Scheme	Clifford circuits	yes	computational

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[BJ15]:AUX	QCircuits with constant T-depth	yes	computational
[BJ15]: EPR	Quantum circuits	Comp of Dec is prop to (#T-gates) ²	computational
[OTF15]	QCircuits with constant #T-gates	yes	inf theoretic

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Clifford Scheme	Clifford circuits	yes	computational
[BJ15]:AUX	QCircuits with constant T-depth	yes	computational
[BJ15]: EPR	Quantum circuits	Comp of Dec is prop to $(\#T\text{-gates})^2$	computational
[OTF15]	QCircuits with constant #T-gates	yes	inf theoretic
Our result	QCircuits of polynomial size (levelled FHE)	yes	computational

(comparison based on Stacey Jeffery's slides)

[BJ15] A. Broadbent, S. Jeffery. Quantum Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits of Low T-gate Complexity. CRYPTO 2015

[OTF15] Y. Ouyang, S-H. Tan, J. Fitzsimons. Quantum homomorphic encryption from quantum codes. [arxiv:1508.00938](https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.00938)



✓ HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

✓ PREVIOUS RESULTS

3. NEW RESULT


ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”



ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

A quantum state that:


- can be efficiently constructed and used



ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

A quantum state that:


- can be efficiently constructed and used
- applies correction iff error was present (iff $a = 1$)



ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

A quantum state that:


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
- can be efficiently constructed and used
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ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

A quantum state that:


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ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

A quantum state that:


- can be efficiently constructed and used
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ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

A quantum state that:

- can be efficiently constructed and used
- applies correction iff error was present (iff $a = 1$)
- is destroyed after a single use



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EXCURSION

Theoretical Computer Science



PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM



PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

- computes some Boolean function $f(x,y)$

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x_i	0: π
	1: σ

y_j	0: π'
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x_k	0: π''
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⋮

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PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

- computes some Boolean function $f(x,y)$
- list of instructions: permutations of $\{1,2, \dots, k\}$

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output: $\dots \circ \sigma'' \circ \sigma' \circ \pi$

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- (fixed) cycle

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output: $\dots \circ \sigma'' \circ \sigma' \circ \pi$

- id $\Rightarrow f(x,y) = 0$
- (fixed) cycle

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length: # of instructions

width: k



EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

length 4, width 5:



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length 4, width 5:

x_1	0: (12345)
	1: id

y_1	0: (12453)
	1: id

x_1	0: (54321)
	1: id

y_1	0: (15243)
	1: (14235)

EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

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
y_1	0: (12453)
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y_1	0: (15243)
	1: (14235)

output:

OR(0,0)



id
0

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
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
output:

OR(0,0)



id
0

OR(0,1)



(14235)
1

EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

length 4, width 5:

x_l	0: (12345)
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y_l	0: (12453)
	1: id

x_l	0: (54321)
	1: id

y_l	0: (15243)
	1: (14235)


output:

OR(0,0)




id
0

OR(0,1)



(14235)
1

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(14235)
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OR(1,1)



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
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
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
id
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BARRINGTON'S THEOREM

Theorem (variation): if $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is in NC^1 ,
then there exists a permutation branching program for f with:

[Barrington 89] Bounded-Width Polynomial-Size Branching Programs Recognize Exactly Those Languages in NC^1 , J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 38 (1): 150–164, 1989

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


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


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Classical homomorphic decryption functions
happen to be in NC^1 ... [BV11]

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
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
ERROR CORRECTION GADGET




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
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
ERROR CORRECTION GADGET




ERROR CORRECTION GADGET




ERROR CORRECTION GADGET




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
 i	$0: \pi$
	$1: \sigma$

 a j	$0: \pi'$
	$1: \sigma'$

 k	$0: \pi''$
	$1: \sigma''$

 a l	$0: \pi'''$
	$1: \sigma'''$

⋮




⋮


ERROR CORRECTION GADGET




 i	$0: \pi$
	$1: \sigma$


 j	$0: \pi'$
	$1: \sigma'$



 k	$0: \pi''$
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⋮




⋮

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET




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
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⋮

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
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
 a l	$0: \pi'''$
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⋮

⋮



EPR pairs



EPR pairs

⋮




ERROR CORRECTION GADGET




 i	$0: \pi$
	$1: \sigma$




 a j	$0: \pi'$
	$1: \sigma'$




 k	$0: \pi''$
	$1: \sigma''$



 a l	$0: \pi'''$
	$1: \sigma'''$

⋮

⋮



EPR pairs


Bell measurements

EPR pairs


Bell measurements



ERROR CORRECTION GADGET



ERROR CORRECTION GADGET



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW


KEY GENERATION



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION


- classical keys



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets




NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets

ENCRYPTION



$|\psi\rangle$


NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets

ENCRYPTION

- apply quantum one-time pad




NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets

ENCRYPTION

- apply quantum one-time pad
- classically encrypt pad keys



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW


KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets

ENCRYPTION

- apply quantum one-time pad
- classically encrypt pad keys

EVALUATION



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION


- classical keys
- gadgets

ENCRYPTION

- apply quantum one-time pad
- classically encrypt pad keys

EVALUATION

- after **H** / **P** / **CNOT**: classically update keys



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION


- classical keys
- gadgets

ENCRYPTION

- apply quantum one-time pad
- classically encrypt pad keys

EVALUATION


- after H / P / $CNOT$: classically update keys
- after T : use 



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW


KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets



ENCRYPTION


- apply quantum one-time pad
- classically encrypt pad keys



EVALUATION

- after **H** / **P** / **CNOT**: classically update keys
- after **T**: use 


DECRYPTION



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW


KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets



ENCRYPTION

- apply quantum one-time pad
- classically encrypt pad keys



EVALUATION

- after **H** / **P** / **CNOT**: classically update keys
- after **T**: use 

DECRYPTION

- classically decrypt pad keys



NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION

- classical keys
- gadgets

ENCRYPTION



- apply quantum one-time pad
- classically encrypt pad keys

EVALUATION

- after H / P / $CNOT$: classically update keys
- after T : use 

DECRYPTION

- classically decrypt pad keys
- remove quantum one-time pad



FUTURE WORK



FUTURE WORK

- non-leveled QFHE?



FUTURE WORK

- non-leveled QFHE?
- verifiable delegated quantum computation



FUTURE WORK

- non-leveled QFHE?
- verifiable delegated quantum computation
- quantum obfuscation?



FUTURE WORK


- non-levelled QFHE?
- verifiable delegated quantum computation
- quantum obfuscation?
- ...





THANK YOU!

QuSoft



QuSoft is hiring two principle investigators:
<http://tinyurl.com/qusoft-job>
Application deadline: 1 September 2016
