

Quantum Cryptography

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Bachelor vak cryptografie

Tuesday, 10 March 2015



1969: Man on the Moon

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


<http://www.unmuseum.org/moonhoax.htm>

- How can you prove that you are at a specific location?

What will you learn from this Talk?

- Recap of Classical Cryptography
- Introduction to Quantum Mechanics
- Post-Quantum Cryptography
- Quantum Key Distribution
- Position-Based Cryptography




Classical Cryptography


- 3000 years of fascinating history
- Until 1970: **private communication** was the only goal



Scytale




Enigma



Modern Cryptography

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- is **everywhere!**
- is concerned with all settings where people **do not trust** each other




Secure Encryption

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$m = \text{'doe you'}$

Alice



$k = 0101\ 1011$



Eve



Bob



$k = 0101\ 1011$

- Goal: Eve **does not learn** the message
- Setting: Alice and Bob share a secret key k

Quiz: eXclusive OR (XOR) Function

- Which of the following are correct?

| | x | y | $x \oplus y$ |
|-----|----------|----------|--------------------------------|
| a.) | 10 | 01 | 10 |
| b.) | 110 | 010 | 100 |
| c.) | 0011 | 0100 | 0000 |
| d.) | 1011 | 1101 | 0110 |

eXclusive OR (XOR) Function

| x | y | $x \oplus y$ |
|---|---|--------------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 |

- Some properties:

- $\forall x : x \oplus 0 = x$

- $\forall x : x \oplus x = 0$

$$\Rightarrow \forall x, y : x \oplus y \oplus y = x$$

One-Time Pad Encryption


9

$m = 0000\ 1111$


$c = m \oplus k = 0101\ 0100$

$m = c \oplus k = 0000\ 1111$

Alice



$k = 0101\ 1011$



Eve



Bob



$k = 0101\ 1011$

- Goal: Eve **does not learn** the message
- Setting: Alice and Bob share a key k
- Recipe:

$m = 0000\ 1111$

$c = 0101\ 0100$

$k = 0101\ 1011$

$k = 0101\ 1011$

| x | y | $x \oplus y$ |
|---|---|--------------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 |

$c = m \oplus k = 0101\ 0100$

$c \oplus k = 0000\ 1111$

$c \oplus k = m \oplus k \oplus k = m \oplus 0 = m$

- Is it secure?

Perfect Security


10

$$m = ?$$


$$c = m \oplus k = 0101 \ 0100$$

$$m = c \oplus k = ?$$

Alice



$k = ?$



Eve



Bob



$k = ?$

- Given that
 - is it possible that
 - Yes, if
 - $c = 0101 \ 0100,$
 - $m = 0000 \ 0000 \ ?$
 - $k = 0101 \ 0100.$
 - is it possible that
 - Yes, if
 - $m = 1111 \ 1111 \ ?$
 - $k = 1010 \ 1011.$
 - it is possible that
 - Yes, if
 - $m = 0101 \ 0101 \ ?$
 - $k = 0000 \ 0001$
- In fact, every m is possible.
- Hence, the one-time pad is **perfectly secure!**

| x | y | $x \oplus y$ |
|---|---|--------------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 |

Problems With One-Time Pad


11

$m = 0000\ 1111$


$c = m \oplus k = 0101\ 0100$

$m = c \oplus k = 0000\ 1111$

Alice



$k = 0101\ 1011$



Eve



Bob



$k = 0101\ 1011$

- The key has to be **as long as** the message.
- The key can only be **used once**.
- In practice, other encryption schemes (such as [AES](#)) are used which allow to encrypt long messages with short keys.
- One-time pad does not provide [authentication](#):
Eve can easily flip bits in the message

Quiz: Encryption & Authentication

- Which of the following are correct?
 - a. Secure encryption guarantees that an eavesdropper cannot learn a message.
 - b. Secure encryption guarantees that a message cannot be altered.
 - c. Authentication guarantees that an eavesdropper cannot learn a message.
 - d. Authentication detects altering of a message.


Symmetric-Key Cryptography

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- Encryption ensures **secrecy**:
Eve **does not learn** the message, e.g. [one-time pad](#)
- Authentication ensures **integrity**:
Eve **cannot alter** the message
- General problem: players have to exchange a key to start with

Public-Key Cryptography



- Solves the key-exchange problem.
- Everyone can encrypt using the [public key](#).
- Only the holder of the **secret key** can decrypt.
- [Digital signatures](#): Only **secret-key** holder can sign, but everyone can verify signatures using the **public-key**.

Quiz: RSA

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- Which of the following are correct?
 - a. RSA is a public-key encryption scheme.
 - b. The security of RSA encryption relies on the computational hardness of factoring large integer numbers.
 - c. The security of RSA encryption relies on the computational hardness of taking discrete logarithms in a finite field.
 - d. RSA encryption is secure against adversaries with unlimited computing power.

RSA Public-Key Encryption

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- Key generation: pick two large primes p and q , set $N=p*q$
- public key: $N, e \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, secret key: $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)$
- $\text{Enc}_{pk}(m) = m^e \bmod N$
- $\text{Dec}_{sk}(c) = c^d \bmod N$
- security relies on the difficulty of factoring N , because $\phi(N)=(p-1)(q-1)$

What will you Learn from this Talk?

✓ Recap of Classical Cryptography

■ Introduction to Quantum Mechanics


■ Post-Quantum Cryptography

■ Quantum Key Distribution

■ Position-Based Cryptography


Quantum Bit: Polarization of a Photon

qubit as unit vector in \mathbb{C}^2




Qubit: Rectilinear/Computational Basis

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
Detecting a Qubit

20




Measuring a Qubit

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Diagonal/Hadamard Basis

22




Measurement:

$$\frac{\begin{matrix} \text{yellow circle with } \rightarrow \\ \text{yellow circle with } \updownarrow \end{matrix} + \frac{\begin{matrix} \text{yellow circle with } \updownarrow \\ \text{yellow circle with } \rightarrow \end{matrix}}{\sqrt{2}} = \begin{matrix} \text{red circle with } \nearrow \\ \text{red circle with } \nwarrow \end{matrix} \text{ --- } \boxed{\begin{matrix} \text{yellow circle with } \nearrow \\ \text{yellow circle with } \updownarrow \end{matrix}} \text{ --- } \begin{matrix} \text{yellow circle with } \rightarrow \\ \text{yellow circle with } \updownarrow \end{matrix}$$


with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$ yields 0 yellow circle with \rightarrow
 with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$ yields 1 yellow circle with \updownarrow

Measuring Collapses the State

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


Measurement:




Measuring Collapses the State

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


Quantum Mechanics


25



+ basis



$|0\rangle_+$



$|1\rangle_+$



\times basis





$|0\rangle_\times$






$|1\rangle_\times$

Measurements:

with prob. 1 yields 1



0/1





0/1

with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$ yields 0

with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$ yields 1





Wonderland of Quantum Mechanics



What will you Learn from this Talk?

- ✓ Recap of Classical Cryptography
- ✓ Introduction to Quantum Mechanics

- Post-Quantum Cryptography

- Quantum Key Distribution

- Position-Based Cryptography

Many Qubits

- 1 qubit lives in a 2-dimensional space, can be in a superposition of 2 states
- 2 qubits live in a 4-dimensional space, can be in a superposition of 4 states

$$\frac{|00\rangle + |01\rangle + |10\rangle + |11\rangle}{2}$$

$$\frac{\left(\longleftrightarrow\right) + \left(\updownarrow\right)}{\sqrt{2}} = \left(\nearrow\swarrow\right)$$

| | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| \longleftrightarrow | \longleftrightarrow | $ 00\rangle$ |
| \longleftrightarrow | \updownarrow | $ 01\rangle$ |
| \updownarrow | \longleftrightarrow | $ 10\rangle$ |
| \updownarrow | \updownarrow | $ 11\rangle$ |

- 3 qubits can be in superposition of 8 states
- n qubits can be in superposition of 2^n states
- So, with 63 qubits, one can do $2^{63} = 9223372036854775808$ calculations simultaneously!
- **Problem: Measuring this huge superposition collapses everything and yields only one random outcome**

Quantum Computing

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- With n qubits, one can do 2^n calculations simultaneously
- **Problem: Measuring this huge superposition will collapse the state and only give one random outcome**
- **Solution: Use quantum interference to measure the computation you are interested in!**




$$\frac{\text{↔} - \text{↕}}{\sqrt{2}} = \text{↗}$$

- seems to work for specific problems only

Quantum Algorithms: Factoring

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

- [Shor '94] Polynomial-time quantum algorithm for factoring integer numbers
- Classical Computer : **Exponential time**
- Quantum Computer : **Poly-time: n^2**
- For a 300 digit number:
 - **Classical: >100 years**
 - **Quantum: 1 minute**



Can We Build Quantum Computers?

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- Possible to build in theory, no fundamental theoretical obstacles have been found yet.



Martinis group (UCSB)
9 qubits


- Canadian company “D-Wave” claims to have build one. Did they?
- 2014: Martinis group recently “[acquired](#)” by Google
- 2014: QuTech centre in Delft



Post-Quantum Cryptography

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- [Shor '94] A large-scale quantum computer **breaks most currently used public-key cryptography** (everything based on factoring and discrete logarithms)
- It is high time to **think about alternative computational problems** which are hard to solve also for quantum computers
- Post-Quantum Cryptography studies classical cryptographic schemes that remain secure in the presence of quantum attackers.




Lattice-Based Cryptography

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
- For any vectors v_1, \dots, v_n in \mathbb{R}^n , the **lattice** spanned by v_1, \dots, v_n is the set of points $L = \{a_1 v_1 + \dots + a_n v_n \mid a_i \text{ integers}\}$

- **Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)**: given a lattice, find a shortest (nonzero) vector



Lattice-Based Cryptography

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- **Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)**: given a lattice, find a shortest (nonzero) vector
- **no efficient (classical or quantum) algorithms known**
- public-key encryption schemes can be built on the computational hardness of SVP

Quiz: Post-Quantum Crypto

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- Which of the following are correct?
 - a. Post-quantum cryptography uses quantum computers to do cryptography
 - b. Post-quantum cryptography studies which classical cryptoschemes remain secure against quantum attackers
 - c. Finding the shortest vector in a high-dimensional lattice is hard for a quantum computer
 - d. Quantum computers are commercially available
 - e. Large-scale quantum computers can never be built.

What will you Learn from this Talk?

- ✓ Recap of Classical Cryptography
- ✓ Introduction to Quantum Mechanics
- ✓ Post-Quantum Cryptography


- Quantum Key Distribution

- Position-Based Cryptography

Demonstration of Quantum Technology

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- generation of random numbers




(diagram from idQuantique white paper)


- no **quantum computation**, only **quantum communication** required

No-Cloning Theorem

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


$|0\rangle_+$



$|1\rangle_+$




Quantum operations:



$|0\rangle_x$



$|1\rangle_x$




Proof: copying is a **non-linear operation**

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

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




[Bennett Brassard 84]



- Offers an **quantum solution** to the key-exchange problem
- Puts the players into the starting position to use symmetric-key cryptography (encryption, authentication etc.).


Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

40 [Bennett Brassard 84]




Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

41 [Bennett Brassard 84]




- Quantum states are unknown to Eve, she **cannot copy them**.
- Honest players can **test** whether Eve interfered.



Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

42

[Bennett Brassard 84]



- **technically feasible**: no quantum computer required, only quantum communication




Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

43

[Bennett Brassard 84]



Alice



Bob



■ tech
only

Quiz: Quantum Key Distribution


44

- Which of the following are correct?
 - a. The no-cloning theorem guarantees the security of quantum key distribution
 - b. A quantum computer is required to perform quantum key distribution
 - c. All public-key systems (e.g. RSA) can be broken by an eavesdropper with unlimited computing power. Hence, QKD is insecure against such eavesdroppers as well.
 - d. The output of QKD for honest players Alice and Bob is a shared classical key.


What will you Learn from this Talk?

- ✓ Recap of Classical Cryptography
- ✓ Introduction to Quantum Mechanics
- ✓ Quantum Key Distribution
- ✓ Post-Quantum Cryptography

■ Position-Based Cryptography



Position-Based Cryptography

- Typically, cryptographic players use **credentials** such as
 - secret information (e.g. password or secret key)
 - authenticated information 
 - biometric features

Can the geographical location of a player be used as cryptographic credential ?




Position-Based Cryptography

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Can the geographical location of a player be used as sole cryptographic credential ?

- Possible Applications:
 - Launching-missile command comes from within the military headquarters
 - Talking to the correct country
 - Pizza-delivery problem / avoid fake calls to emergency services
 - ...



Position-Based Cryptography

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NOS OP 3

Gamer krijgt SWAT-team in z'n nek: swatting


🕒 29-08-2014, 05:49 AANGEPAST OP 29-08-2014, 05:49

Zit je lekker een oorlogsspel te spelen, valt er ineens een SWAT-team binnen. Dat gebeurde een Amerikaanse gamer. Hij had net in de livestream van z'n spel *Counter Strike* tegen zijn medespelers 'I think we're being swatted' - toen de deur openbrak en inderdaad een zwaarbewapend arrestatieteam binnenviel.

Dat was allemaal live te zien op de webcam:

Basic task: Position Verification


49



- Prover wants to convince verifiers that she is at a **particular position**
- no **coalition of (fake) provers**, i.e. not at the claimed position, can convince verifiers
- assumptions:
 - communication at speed of light
 - instantaneous computation
 - verifiers can coordinate

Position Verification: First Try


50



■ distance bounding [Brands Chaum '93]

Position Verification: Second Try

51




position verification is classically impossible !

The Attack


52



$$f(x, y) = (a, b)$$




- copying classical information
- this is impossible quantumly



Position Verification: Quantum Try

53


[Kent Munro Spiller 03/10]




- Can we brake the scheme now?

Attacking Game

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


- Impossible to cheat due to non-cloning theorem
- Or not?



EPR Pairs


55 [Einstein Podolsky Rosen 1935]



- “spukhafte Fernwirkung” (spooky action at a distance)
- EPR pairs **do not allow to communicate** (no contradiction to relativity theory)
- can provide a shared random bit

Quantum Teleportation


56 [Bennett Brassard Crépeau Jozsa Peres Wootters 1993]



- does **not contradict relativity theory**
- teleported state can only be recovered once the classical information σ arrives


Quantum Teleportation

57 [Bennett Brassard Crépeau Jozsa Peres Wootters 1993]



- does **not contradict relativity theory**
- teleported state can only be recovered once the classical information σ arrives

Teleportation Attack



- It is **possible to cheat** with entanglement !!
- Quantum teleportation allows to **break the protocol perfectly**.



No-Go Theorem

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[Buhrman, Chandran, Fehr, Gelles, Goyal, Ostrovsky, Schaffner 2010]

- Any position-verification protocol **can be broken** using an exponential number of entangled qubits.



- **Question:** Are so many quantum resources really necessary?

- Does there exist a protocol such that:
 - **honest** prover and verifiers are efficient, but
 - any **attack** requires lots of entanglement



Quiz: Position-Based Q Crypto

60

- Which of the following are correct?
 - a. Position verification using classical protocols is impossible against unbounded colluding attackers
 - b. Position verification using quantum protocols is impossible against unbounded colluding attackers
 - c. Quantum teleportation can send information faster than the speed of light
 - d. Entangled qubits are difficult to create in practice.
 - e. Entangled qubits are difficult to store for 1 second in practice.

What have you learned today?


- ✓ Recap of Classical Cryptography
- ✓ Introduction to Quantum Mechanics
- ✓ Quantum Key Distribution
- ✓ Post-Quantum Cryptography
- ✓ Position-Based Cryptography

What Have You Learned from this Talk?

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✓ Recap of Classical Cryptography

- Long [history](#)
- [One-time pad](#)



$m = 0000\ 1111$

Alice



$k = 0101\ 1011$

$c = m \oplus k = 0101\ 0100$



$k = ?$
Eve



Bob



$k = 0101\ 1011$


- [Public-key cryptography](#), e.g. RSA

What Have You Learned from this Talk?


63

✓ Quantum Mechanics

- Qubits



- No-cloning



- Entanglement




- Quantum Teleportation




What Have You Learned from this Talk?

64

✓ Quantum Computing




✓ Post-Quantum Cryptography




What Have You Learned from this Talk?

65

✓ Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)



✓ Position-Based Cryptography



Thank you for your attention!

Questions



Quiz: Quantum Crypto

67

- Which of the following are correct?
 - a. Quantum Crypto studies the impact of quantum technology on the field of cryptography
 - b. As RSA encryption will be broken by quantum computers, we should switch to other systems already now (in order to secure information for more than 10 years)
 - c. Position-based cryptography exploits the fact that information cannot travel faster than the speed of light
 - d. Quantum Key Distribution is fundamentally more secure than classical public-key cryptography