

# A Constructivist Approach to Rule-Bases

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*Leibniz Center for Law* University of Amsterdam  Samuel lives in a sunny country. He never checks the weather before going out.





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 What do you expect if they switch country of residence?



## **Deliberation and Performance**

- In everyday life, we do not deliberate at each moment *what to do next*.
- Our practical reasoning is mostly based on applying already structured behavioural *scripts*.
- Such scripts are constructed by education and experience, and refined by some adaptation process.



# Deliberation and Performance in the legal system

- Structuration exemplified by
  - *Stare deciris* (binding precedent) principle
  - existence and maintenance of sources of law.
- Sources of law are artifacts which describe and prescribe the institutional powers and duties of the social components, including institutional agencies (e.g. public administrations)



#### Simplified target architecture regulatory regulated environment system system provides interacts, according rules to.. to the rules, with..



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Focus on *rule bases*







• When a new rule is introduced what happens to the rest of the rule base?



# A simple\* example

- On Sunday we eat outdoor.
  - r1: sunday -> eat\_outdoor

\* We are neglecting predication, deontic characterizations, intentionality, causation, etc..



# A simple example

- On Sunday we eat outdoor.
  - r1: sunday -> eat\_outdoor
- If it is raining, we never eat outdoor.
  - r2: raining -> -eat\_outdoor

classic negation



# A simple example

- On Sunday we eat outdoor.
  - r1: sunday -> eat\_outdoor
- If it is raining, we never eat outdoor.
   r2: raining -> -eat outdoor
- What to do when it is Sunday and it is raining?



# **Priority-based** representation

- On Sunday we eat outdoor.
  - r1: sunday -> eat\_outdoor
- If it is raining, we never eat outdoor.
  - r2: raining -> -eat\_outdoor
- A possible solution is defining the priority between rules. e.g. r2 > r1
- From a formal characterization, we are in the domain of *defeasible reasoning*.



# Institutional mechanisms

- lex posterior derogat priori
  - $\rightarrow$  the most recent law is stronger
- *lex specialis derogat generali* → the law with lower abstraction is stronger
- lex superior derogat inferiori
   → the hierachical order in the legal system counts

r1: you have to pay taxes at the end of the year.r2: if you are at loss with your activity, you don't have to pay taxes.



"natural" meta-rules

defining priorities

• Alternative solution: modify the premises of the relevant rules with less priority.



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If it is raining, we never eat outdoor.
 r2: rain -> -eat outdoor



- Alternative solution: modify the premises of the relevant rules with less priority.
- On Sunday we eat outdoor, unless it is raining.
   r1': sunday and -rain -> eat\_outdoor
- If it is raining, we never eat outdoor.
   r2: rain -> -eat outdoor



- Alternative solution: modify the premises of the relevant rules with less priority.
- On Sunday we eat outdoor, unless it is raining.
   r1': sunday and -rain -> eat\_outdoor
- If it is raining, we never eat outdoor.
  - r2: rain -> -eat\_outdoor

→ cf. "distinguishing" action in common law



# **Conversion algorithms**

- Horty (2011) has analyzed the mechanisms of precedential reasoning, proposing an algorithm of conversion
  - from *priority-based* to *constraint-based*

Horty, J. F. (2011). Rules and Reasons in the Theory of Precedent. Legal Theory, 17(01):1–33.



# Conversion algorithms

- Our work presents algorithms and a computational implementation for the full cycle of conversions:
  - from *priority-based* (PB) to *constraint-based* (CB)
  - from CB to *full-tabular* CB
  - from *full-tabular* CB to *minimal* CB
  - from *full-tabular* CB to PB (given the priority)

http://justinian.leibnizcenter.org/rulebaseconverter









*remove the domain already evaluated* 



full-tabular CB(intermediate) CBPB
$$a \land \neg b \Rightarrow p$$
 $a \land \neg b \Rightarrow p$  $a \Rightarrow p$  $a \land b \Rightarrow \neg p$  $b \Rightarrow \neg p$  $b \Rightarrow \neg p$  $\neg a \land b \Rightarrow \neg p$  $\neg a \land \neg b \Rightarrow ?$ 

*expand the premises to all relevant factors* 





to reduce to the minimal canonical form





Quine-McCluskey et similar algorithms are commonly used for *logic ports* synthesis



#### Constraint-based

$$\begin{array}{c} a \wedge \neg b \rightarrow p \\ b \rightarrow \neg p \end{array}$$











priority	Con
2	a
1	
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#### onstraint-based

$$\begin{array}{c} a \wedge \neg b \rightarrow p \\ b \rightarrow \neg p \end{array}$$

elevant situations  $a \wedge b$   $a \wedge \neg b$   $\neg a \wedge b$  $\neg a \wedge \neg b$  full-tabular CB $a \land \neg b \rightarrow p$  $a \land b \rightarrow \neg p$  $\neg a \land b \rightarrow \neg p$ 



	for each rule, check if it applies to situations yet to be evaluated		
oriority	Constraint-based	<i>full-tabular</i> CB	
2	$a \wedge \neg b \rightarrow p$	$a \wedge \neg b \rightarrow p$	
1	$b \rightarrow \neg p$	$a \wedge b \rightarrow \neg p$	
		$\neg a \wedge b \rightarrow \neg p$	
	relevant situations		
	$a \wedge b$		
	$a \wedge \neg b$		
	$\neg a \wedge b$		
	$\neg a \land \neg b$		
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. . . .









priority	Constraint-based	<i>full-tabular</i> CE
2	$a \wedge \neg b \rightarrow p$	$a \wedge \neg b \rightarrow p$
1	$b \rightarrow \neg p$	$a \wedge b \rightarrow \neg p$
		$\neg a \wedge b \rightarrow \neg p$
	relevant situations	
	$-a \wedge b$	
<i>remove</i> $a \land \neg b$		
evalu	<i>iated</i> <u>¬a∧b</u>	
situa	tions $\neg a \land \neg b$	

$$full-tabular CB$$
$$a \land \neg b \rightarrow p$$
$$a \land b \rightarrow \neg p$$
$$\neg a \land b \rightarrow \neg p$$

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# Adaptation

# Second problem: Adaptation



How an existing rule-base is "adapted" to a certain environment?



# Two perspectives on adaptation

#### top-down, *design*

*optimization theory* : adaptation comes from the agent's efforts to obtain a better overall pay-off.

#### bottom-up, *emergence*

*e.g. theory of predictable behaviour* (Heiner 1983): behavioural regularities arise in the presence of *uncertainty* about the "right" course of action

Heiner, R. (1983). The origin of predictable behavior. The American economic review, 73(4):560–595.



# Payoff analysis

# $E[payoff] = p(success) \cdot E[payoff of success] + p(failure) \cdot E[payoff of failure]$



# Investigation payoff analysis

 $E[payoff] = p(success) \cdot E[payoff of concluding C]$  $+ p(failure) \cdot E[payoff of not concluding C]$ 



#### Externalizing costs...

 $E[payoff] = p(success) \cdot E[payoff of concluding C]$  $+ p(failure) \cdot E[payoff of not concluding C]$ - cost



# Rule application payoff analysis

- $E[payoff] = p(success) \cdot E[payoff of concluding C]$  $+ p(failure) \cdot E[payoff of not concluding C]$ - cost
  - A rule may be seen as an investigation about a conclusion C.

$$r:c_1 \wedge c_2 \wedge \dots \wedge c_n \rightarrow C$$
  
$$p(success) = p(c_1 \wedge c_2 \wedge \dots \wedge c_n)$$



# Rule application payoff analysis

 $E[payoff] = p(success) \cdot E[payoff of concluding C]$  $+ p(failure) \cdot E[payoff of not concluding C]$ -cost

 Furthermore, we assume that the *not*applicability of a certain rule does not entail other consequences beside the cost.



# **Optimization constraint**

 $E[payoff] = p(success) \cdot E[payoff of concluding C]$ -cost

 The use of a rule is worth if E[payoff]>0 or, equivalently:

$$\begin{split} E[payoff of concluding C] > \frac{cost}{p(success)} &= \frac{cost}{p(c_1 \land .. \land c_n)} \\ p(c_1 \land .. \land c_n) > \frac{cost}{E[payoff of concluding C]} \end{split}$$



• If it rains, take the umbrella.

r: rain -> umbrella



• If it rains, take the umbrella.

```
r: rain -> umbrella
```

The payoff of applying *r* is :  $E[payoff] = p(rain) \cdot G - cost(\{rain\}, K)$ 

- G is the payoff of deciding to take the umbrella (indipendent from the rule used).
- cost({rain}, K) is the cost of inferring the fact rain, given the knowledge base K.



• If it rains, take the umbrella.

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r: rain -> umbrella
```

```
The payoff of applying r is :

E[payoff] = p(rain) \cdot G - cost(\{rain\}, K)
```

Imagine the agent has no clue about rain

- Raphael (rainy country): p(rain) significant  $\rightarrow E > 0$ 



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r: rain -> umbrella
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The payoff of applying r is :

E[payoff] = p(rain) \cdot G - cost(\{rain\}, K)
```

- Imagine the agent has no clue about rain
  - Raphael (rainy country): p(rain) significant  $\rightarrow E > 0$
  - Samuel (sunny country): p(rain) ~ 0 → E < 0!</li>



# Default assumptions (ASP syntax)

- When the payoff may be negative (e.g. Samuel), we may introduce a default rule which overrides the investigation.
- If it rains, take the umbrella.

```
rain -> umbrella
```

If you don't know if it rains, than it doesn't rain.
 not rain -> -rain.
 default negation classic negation (negation as failure)

# Better payoff $\rightarrow$ higher priority

- The analysis of evaluation payoffs provides an optimal order of investigation: choose the *r* which maximises payoff!
- To be used for CB to PB optimal conversions.



#### Construction and reconstruction

 incremental modifications, determining a partial reconfiguration of the operational knowledge used by the agent.



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  - because of *distinguishing* actions, the new rules brings to the foreground factors left implicit in the previous rules.
- **ad-hoc reorganizations**, aiming for better adaptation.
  - When a rule base is "compiled" to a more efficient priority-based form, we lose the reasons motivating that structure (e.g. probabilistic assumptions)



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- He has to unveil the underlying constraint-based representation, removing all default assumptions and recompute the priority indexes.
- Why the agent should do that?
  - e.g. because of a number of *practical failures* exceeding a certain threshold.



#### Holistic view





# Conclusion

- Our analysis has not targeted beliefs, as in *belief revision*.
- We have not used a model of theory revision accounting both facts and rules, as in *machine learning*.
- Our work focuses "just" on *rules*, already defined at symbolic level, and on rule-based systems.
  - affinity with *expert systems* literature



# Conclusion

- The paper started with the intention of completing Horty's work on the conversion between CB and PB representations.
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- The paper started with the intention of completing Horty's work on the conversion between CB and PB representations.
- The additional adaption analysis grew up from our experience with default assumptions in ASP.
- Obviously, many research directions remain:
  - formal analysis, computational complexity
  - bottom-up adaptation
  - interactions with other theoretical frameworks
  - considering "real" rule-bases

