

Similarity and Contrast on Conceptual Spaces for Pertinent Description Generation

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the caudate nucleus is an internal brain structure which is very close to the lateral ventricles



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- relies on some *metric* to compare inputs
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geometrical model of cognition









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 similarity in human judgments does not satisfy **fundamental** geometric axioms [Tversky77]

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• approaching logical structures through geometric methods (e.g. [Distel2014])

Towards an alternative solution..

associationistic methods

conceptual spaces

symbolic methods

Overview on conceptual spaces

• Conceptual spaces stem from (continuous) perceptive spaces.

grounded

- Natural **properties** emerge as convex regions over *integral domains* (e.g. color).
- **Concepts** are combinations of properties
- **Prototypes** can be seen as centroids of convex regions (properties or concepts).
 - ↔ convex regions can be seen as resulting from the competition between prototypes (forming a *Voronoi Tessellation*).

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Why do we say "**red dogs**" even if they are actually brown?



images after Google

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predicates are generated on the fly after an operation of contrast.



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These dogs are "red dogs":

- not because their color is red (they are brown),
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Test:

• Colors of 9 common dog furs on the internet

	Hue	Luminance	Saturation
mean:	[0.10,	0.52,	0.46]
std dev:	[0.02,	0.22,	0.27]



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0.29 is the std dev of a uniform distribution on [0, 1]! we neglect the dimensions approaching it.



0.2

0.4 Hue

0.6

0.8

0.3

C = O - P

1.0

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9.0 Saturation

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O P	= =	[0.07, [0.10,	0.24, *,	0.92] *]
С	=	[-0.16,	0.24,	0.92]







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vellow

red sable

green

cyan

vellow

blue

magenta

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If our hypothesis is correct, $C = A - B \sim$ "above"

Before we handled points, here we have extended objects. \rightarrow mathematical morphology methods



We considered an existing method [Bloch2006] used in image processing to compute directional relative positions of visual entities (e.g. of biomedical images).



models of relations for a point centered in the origin













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- But what about concept (i.e. multi-dimensional) similarity?

"she is strong."

this person – prototype person ~ "strong"

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(metaphor as conceptual analogy)

"she is (like) a lion."

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double contrast

```
  target

  this person – prototype person
  ~ "strong", etc.

  prototype lion – prototype animal
  ~ "strong", etc.

  reference
  < comparison ground</td>
```

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The reference activates certain discriminating features.

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Concept similarity is a sequential, multi-layered computation





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Our explanation: changing of reference activates different features

2. Problems with triangle inequality

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However,

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1977



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Our explanation: different/no comparison grounds after contrast

3. Problems with minimality

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Our explanation: sequential nature of similarity assessment.

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Our explanation: effect due to the **change of group prototype**

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- This hypothesis provides simple explanations to empirical experiences manifesting non-metrical properties, yet maintaining a geometric infrastructure.
- Future investigations: normalizing effects, contrast with regions, non-descriptive pertinence.