


The Role of **Normware** in Trustworthy and Explainable AI

Giovanni Sileno (g.sileno@uva.nl), Alexander Boer, Tom van Engers

XAILA, eXplainable AI and Law workshop, JURIX 2018 @ Groningen 12 December 2018




with the (supposedly) near advent of *autonomous artificial entities*, or other forms of *distributed automatic decision making*,

- humans less and less in the loop
- increasing concerns about *unintended consequences*



Unintended consequences: bad or limited design


Unintended consequences: bad or limited design




Unintended consequences: bad or limited design

- Wallet hacks, fraudulent actions and bugs in the in the *blockchain* sector during 2017:
 - CoinDash ICO Hack (\$10 millions)
 - Parity Wallet Breach (\$105 millions)
 - Enigma Project Scum
 - Parity Wallet Freeze (\$275 millions)
 - Tether Token Hack (\$30 millions)
 - Bitcoin Gold Scam (\$3 millions)
 - NiceHash Market Breach (\$80 millions)







 Software used across the US predicting future crimes and criminals biased against African Americans (2016)




- Software used across the US predicting future crimes and criminals biased against African Americans (2016)
 - Existing statistical bias (correct **description**)
 - When used for prediction on an individual it is read as *behavioural predisposition*, i.e. it is interpreted as a *mechanism*.
 - A biased judgment introduces here negative consequences in society.



- Software used across the US predicting future crimes and criminals biased against African Americans (2016)
- **Problem**: role of *circumstantial evidence*, how to integrate statistical inference in judgment?








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 Consider a diagnostic application predicting whether the patient has *appendicitis*:





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


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Explainable AI

- Explainable AI has basically two drivers:
 - reject unacceptable conclusions
 - satisfy reasonable requirements of expertise
- But what qualifies a conclusion as "unacceptable"? And what might be used to define an expertise to be "reasonable"?
- claim: normware!

i.e. *computational artifacts specifying shared expectations* ("norm" as in *normality*)



Trustworthy AI

- **Trustworthiness** for artificial devices could be associated to the requirement of not falling into *paperclip maximizer* scenarios:
 - of not taking "wrong" decisions, of performing "wrong" actions, wrong because having disastrous impact
- How to (attempt to) satisfy this requirement?
- claim: normware!

i.e. *computational artifacts specifying shared drivers* ("norm" as in *normativity*)

A tentative taxonomy



hardware

physical device

when running \rightarrow physical mechanism

situated in a physical environment



software

symbolic device

when running → symbolic mechanism

relies on physical mechanisms

relies on symbolic mechanisms

control structure

control structure

normware

A tentative taxonomy



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normware

Is **normware** just a type of software?

A tentative taxonomy




hardware


physical device

when running \rightarrow physical mechanism


situated in a physical environment



 Traditionally, engineering is about the conception of *devices* to implement certain *functions*. Functions are always defined within a certain **operational context** to satisfy certain **needs**.



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 optimization is made possible by specifying a reward function associated to certain goals

goal: fishing, **reward**: proportional to quantity of fish, inversely to effort.

individual solution to optimization problem:

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"fishing with bombs"

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acknowledgement of undesirable second-order effects.

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by whom?




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
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
Planning with adaptations


• The process illustrated a *two steps decision-making process,* enabling "tactical" optimization and "strategic" control.




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








- In general, supervised machine learning involves:
 - a data-flow computational network
 - parameters distributed along the network
 - a ML method enabling adaptation of parameters against some feedback, e.g. output error in the training phase
 - an oracle making targets explicit









This seems the root of our problems with ML. Can we repair it?




- In evolutionary terms, we could consider a multitude of different non-adaptive black-boxes, covering several configurations of parameters, competing for computational resources.
 - For each learning step, the oracle sets the means to select the best performing black-box(es), for which access to computational resources for future predictions will be granted as a *reward*. [...]
- But who "pays" the oracle?




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- The **higher-level diagnostic feedback** implies that also the system drivers should pass from a **selection mechanism**.






- Let's use this architecture on a concrete example: IBM Watson (building upon a network of intelligent QA agents).
 - a question is given
 - the system has to guess
 - what the question demands (~ oracles)
 - what is the answer (~ **black-box**),
 - correct response is given by the jury (~ second-order oracle)




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Let's apply it to our initial problems!


Example: neutrality constraint



Example: strategic protection to unintended consequences



Example: alignment to expert knowledge for explanation



Perspectives

- This position paper aims to highlight the crucial role of normware with respect to trustworthy and explainable AI
 - ML approaches usually do not consider this level of abstraction
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 - computational artifacts specifying norms
 - ecology of components guiding the system components including sub-symbolic ones!

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- This position paper aims to highlight the crucial role of normware with respect to trustworthy and explainable AI
 - ML approaches usually do not consider this level of abstraction
 - ethical/responsible AI studies target higher level constraints
- It makes clear two perspectives on normware:
 - computational artifacts specifying norms
 - ecology of components guiding the system components including sub-symbolic ones!
- The ecological perspective has been overlooked in our field, but reminds of visionary ideas presented in the history of AI (Minsky's society of minds, Brooks' intelligent creatures).

A less tentative taxonomy



hardware

physical device

when running → physical mechanism

situated in a physical environment



software

symbolic device

when running → symbolic mechanism

relies on physical mechanisms

2

normware

coordination device

when *adopted* → interactional mechanism

relies on symbolic mechanisms

control structure

control structure

guidance structure