# OPEN PROBLEMS IN LOGIC AND GAMES

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## 1       The setting, the purpose, and a warning

Dov Gabbay is a prolific logician just by himself. But beyond that, he is quite good at making other people investigate the many further things he cares about. As a result, King's College London has become a powerful attractor in our field worldwide. Thus, it is a great pleasure to be an organizer for one of its flagship events: the Augustus de Morgan Workshop of 2005. Benedikt Loewe and I proposed the topic of 'interactive logic' for this occasion, with an emphasis on *social software* – the logical analysis and design of social procedures – and on *games*, arguably the formal interactive setting par excellence. This choice reflects current research interests in our logic community at ILLC Amsterdam and beyond. In this broad area of interfaces between logic, computer science, and game theory, this paper is my own attempt at playing Dov. I am, perhaps not telling, but at least *asking* other people to find out for me what I myself cannot.

A word of historical clarification may help here. The last time the Dutch came up the Thames (in 1667), we messed up the harbour, burnt down a few buildings, and took the English flagship the Royal Charles with us as a souvenir. The Medway Raid was still commemorated as late as 1967 in a joint ceremony. This time, however, our intentions are wholly peaceful. May the Great Game of logic flourish to the benefit of all!

What follows is a sketch of some research lines on logic and games, which occur in logic itself, computer science, and game theory. What I personally find most interesting about these recent interfaces is the importance of *interaction* between several agents as a fundamental theme in logic itself, and the new ways in which mathematical logics of computation and philosophical logics of epistemic attitudes come together. The following story is just my attempt at systematizing issues and problems. There is no pretense at completeness. Comments – and solutions – are highly welcome!

A warning beforehand is in order though, to set the right expectations for the reader. The descriptions of themes and open problems in this paper are more like a light tourist guide for Places To Visit, than one for specific Things To Do. This reflects the tentative state of the area of Logic and Games. It is less centered around one well-established  family of formal systems than dynamic epistemic logic of information update, where I have surveyed open problems earlier this year (van Benthem 2005C).

## 2     Logic and Games

Logic and games meet in several different ways.

***Logic games*** First, argumentation itself is a sort of game where opposing players can win or lose. And thus, in addition to its more dominant semantic or deductive underpinnings, logical validity also has a game-like aspect of *winning strategies* for players defending valid conclusions from given discourse positions. In addition to argumentation or dialogue games, modern logicians also use a host of other scenarios, usually two-player games of perfect information, for tasks of semantic evaluation in given models, model construction, comparison of two models, proof search, or even general interaction. Some well-known names in these developments are Lorenzen, Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé, Hintikka – but one can also mention more recent authors like Hodges, Abramsky, Girard, or Hirsch & Hodkinson. For references to this literature, cf. my lecture notes *Logic in Games* (van Benthem 1999–..., still under construction), whose main line of exposition for the 'Logic & Games' interface is followed here. A compact survey of logic games by Wilfrid Hodges is found in the Stanford Electronic Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-games/.

***Game logics*** But indeed, general games of any sort have an obvious logical structure as multi-actor process graphs that can be described in some logical language. This invites the use of logical machinery, in addition to the standard mathematics of game theory. One stream here consist of process languages like modal or dynamic logic, fixed-point languages, temporal logic, or linear logic. This links up with research in logics of computation, and in principle, it provides all the benefits achieved there for games as well: such as better understanding of algorithms, and perhaps even better design.

But there is also another stream. From the outset, the predictions of game theory about equilibria that 'rational' players will or must choose have been a matter of intensive debate. Here, logic has entered since the 1970s as an analysis of the knowledge and beliefs of players underpinning their choices, and the deliberations that go into them. Thus, epistemic logic, conditional logic, and other high-lights of philosophical logic have entered the scene (partially discovered independently by game theorists), promising conceptual clarification of the issues involved, as well as a more systematic view of options for 'rational' agents and rational procedures.

'Game logics' are logical systems designed for the purpose of analyzing games. Modern game logics often combine the preceding two aspects, so that one could – and does – have 'epistemic dynamic logics' for analyzing the strategies that a player might consider or choose in a given game. Other current topics in this area concern more

generic structure of games in general, such as the analysis of general game-forming operations and the resulting algebraic laws. Such issues often cross over into the special area of logic games – making the above distinction between logic games and game logics one of convenience, rather than of principle. E.g., van Benthem 2003B shows that special predicate-logical evaluation games are complete for the algebra of sequential operations on arbitrary games. Finally, as in other newly developing areas, there is a tendency to design *new logics* and coin new terminology, rather than using the more boring expedient of using existing ones, like standard first-order and modal logic. Who wants to use old tools when the World looks fresh and new? We will also be guilty of this, though we also mention some more conservative approaches.

***General activities and information***   Material on the Logic/Games interface may be found at several places in the literature, though there is no standard source, let alone a textbook. But cf. van Benthem 1999–..., Hodges 1998, van der Hoek & Pauly 2005 for some broader perspectives. The Amsterdam web page http://www.illc.uva.nl/~lgc is a public resource under construction, pointing at relevant papers and journals. Regular conferences serving as a forum for work in this area include *TARK* (www.tark.org), and *LOFT* (http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bonanno/LOFT6.html and the more ad-hoc but quite frequent *GLC* meetings (http://www.illc.uva.nl/lgc/events.html). Congenial activities at the games computer science interface include networks such as the EC-sponsored *GAMES*, based in Aachen (http://www.games.rwth-aachen.de).

Here and elsewhere, for precise definitions of basic notions concerning games, we refer to the literature. A good compact reference is Osborne & Rubinstein 1994, while Hofbauer & Sigmund 2002 is an up-to-date one on modern evolutionary game theory.

## 2   Extensive Games as Processes

Extensive games of perfect information are trees whose nodes represent stages of the game, while leaves represent possible final outcomes, which players can evaluate, and compare as to their individual preferences. Players' turns are indicated at all non-final nodes, and arrows pointing to daughter nodes represent their possible moves there. Game trees can be finite or infinite. In the latter case, infinite branches may sometimes be a nuisance, such as a computer getting stuck forever in a loop, or in argumentation, a person's eternal inability to come to the point. But infinite branches can also be viewed positively as unbounded histories of successful interaction, as with unlimited computational facilities like the internet, or indeed, the functioning of social life. Whether finite or infinite, game structures are much like those used in computer science or logic for representing processes via graphs, trees, or other mathematical

notions. Thus, immediate analogies spring to mind with well-known logics for describing computational processes and general action. We list a few topics here.

***Caveat*** The following questions are mainly concerned with comparing different approaches, and unification across different traditions. A more ambitious goal would be the study of wholly new topics that belong to neither logic nor game theory as normally conceived. A good mine for clues is the extensive body of work on games in *temporal logic*, where issues arise by mixing standard questions about games with those about computational processes (cf. van der Meyden 2005, Ramanujam 2005).

### *2.1 Game equivalence and bisimulation*

Computational logics do not have one fixed level of detail for studying processes and actions. Just as in different mathematical theories of space (affine or metric geometry, topology, linear algebra), there are legitimate choices of structural similarity relations, reflecting what structure of a process one finds of interest (van Benthem 1996). The spectrum runs from output-oriented identifications like *finite trace equivalence*, through the finer *modal bisimulation* which also record internal choice points for agents involved in the process, to the most demanding notion of *isomorphism*. The same spectrum makes sense for games (van Benthem 2002A), from *equivalence of players' powers* for determining final outcomes, through modal game bisimulation, to again stronger notions of isomorphism preserving more game structure.

***Action equivalence versus outcome equivalence*** Consider the following two games , which represent evaluation of the two sides of the logical law of Distribution:

$p \land (q \lor r) \leftrightarrow (p \land q) \lor (p \land r):$



Are these games the same? The answer depends on our level of interest:

(a)    *If we focus on turns and moves, then the two games are not equivalent.*

For they differ in 'protocol' (who gets to play first) and in choice structure. This natural level for looking at games with local moves and choices is that of modal bisimulations. But one might also look at the achievable outcomes only. And then,

(b)    *If we focus on outcomes only, then the two games are equivalent.*

The reason is that players can force the same sets of outcomes across games:

*A* can force the outcome to fall in the sets    *{p}, {q, r},*

*E* can force the outcome to fall in the sets    *{p, q}, {p, r}.*

Here 'forcing' refers to sets of outcomes guaranteed by strategies for players, their 'powers'. A strategy forces a set *X* if all outcomes of the game, with arbitrary play by the others, fall inside *X*. In the left-hand tree, *A* has 2 strategies, and so does *E*, yielding the listed sets. In the right-hand tree, *E* has again 2 strategies, while *A* has 4: *LL, LR, RL, RR*. Of these, *LL* yields the outcome set *{p}*, and *RR* yields *{q, r}*. But *LR, RL* guarantee only supersets *{p, r}, {q, p}* of *{p}:* i.e., weaker powers. Thus the same control results in both games. More generally, at an input–output level, propositional distribution switches the scheduling of a game without affecting players' powers.

An appropriate bisimulation for this outcome level of game equivalence has been proposed in many areas independently (van Benthem, van Eijck & Stebletsova 1994):

A *power bisimulation* between game models *M, N* is a relation

*Z* between game states in *M, N* satisfying the two conditions:

(1)     if $x \, \mathbf{Z} \, y$, then *x, y* satisfy the same proposition letters.

(2a)    for each *i*, if $x \, \mathbf{Z} \, y$ and *i* can force *U* starting from *x*,
        then there is a set *V* which *i* can force starting from *y*,
        such that $\forall v \in V \; \exists u \in U: u \, \mathbf{Z} \, v$

(2b)    vice versa from *y* to *x*.

Thus, game equivalences come in varieties depending on one's level of interest: from coarser to finer. But there has been no systematic theory so far of all natural levels.

♣     *Problem 1*     What are natural structural equivalences for games?

So far, we have only considered 'game forms' without the preferences among outcomes that make for real games. But the same equivalence levels approach also works when extra structure is present in games, such as players preferences (cf. Section 2.3).

***Invariants and languages***   Structural similarities among processes or games induce a set of properties that are *invariant*: i.e., they hold for one structure if and only if they hold for its structural equivalents. Invariants can typically be described in a *language* – usually some logical formalisms describing just those properties that are relevant at the given equivalence level. A typical result underpinning this connection says that two finite models are isomorphic iff they satisfy the same first-order sentences. There are much more sophisticated connection results in this vein, some of them involving (...) logic games of model comparison, viz. the well-known Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games. In process logics, one simple connection result in the same spirit says that

There exists a bisimulation between two finite rooted process models *(M, s)* and *(N, t)* iff the roots *s, t* satisfy the same formulas in the modal propositional language describing available moves and atomic properties of nodes.

A similar approach works for extensive games. Choosing a description level matches choosing a particular logical language, modal, first-order, or yet other, to describe properties of nodes in game trees. We start with some obviously available candidates.

### 2.2 Modal and dynamic logics for moves and strategies

**Modal logic**  Propositional modal logic describes process models

$$M = (S, (R_a)_a, V)$$

with modal formulas $\phi$ stating properties of states $s \in S$, such as

$[a]\!<\!b\!>\!p$:     after every $R_a$-step from *s* to any *t*, there is an
           $R_a$–step from *t* to some state *u* where *p* holds.

This $\forall\exists$ pattern of successive modalities is typical for interaction between players: any *a*-move can be countered by some suitably chosen *b*-move leading to an outcome *p*. Thus, modal logic describes possible moves and choices for players in a game tree. The  modal similarity type for the latter looks roughly like this:

$$M = (NODES, MOVES, PLAYERS, \textbf{turn}, \textbf{end}, VAL)$$

**Dynamic logic**  A more explicit account of players' plans and strategies requires a richer propositional dynamic logic *PDL* which also has programs $\pi$ describing binary relations between states, representing the transitions corresponding to successful executions of $\pi$. One can think here of computation steps – but by now, *PDL* is used as a very general logic for describing any complex action. These are constructed

from atomic moves *a* and tests *?$\phi$* by the three sequential
operations  of composition *;*, choice $\cup$, and finite iteration $^*$.

This language describes game trees in more detail than basic modal logic, using  e.g., iterations of single moves to describe arbitrary finite paths. But even more importantly, *PDL* can describe the fundamental game-theoretic notion of a *strategy*. For, a player's strategy is nothing but a binary relation giving her a move at each of her turns – where non-deterministic strategies may even allow more than one option. Natural descriptions of interactive strategies have precisely the sequential and conditional format of *PDL*:

"*IF* your opponent plays *a*, *THEN* play *b ELSE* play *c*",
"*WHILE* your have not reached some goal, *DO* move *a*".

It is also easy to see that, at least in finite games, *PDL* can easily describe the unique outcome states of games when players *i* play a profile of functional strategies $\sigma_i$.

**$\mu$–calculus and LFP(FO)**   Beyond *PDL*, richer fixed-point languages such as the modal $\mu$–calculus define arbitrary smallest and greatest fixed-point predicates in the modal language by means of recursive definitions. This genuine extension of *PDL* is needed for a faithful rendering of basic game-theoretic algorithms such as Zermelo Colouring when showing that finite two-player zero-sum games are determined. E.g., winning nodes for player *i* in such a game tree are defined by the following recursion:

$$WIN_i \; \leftrightarrow \; (\textbf{\textit{end}} \; \& \; \textbf{\textit{win}}_i) \lor (\textbf{\textit{turn}}_i \; \& \; <\textbf{\textit{E}}> WIN_i) \lor (\textbf{\textit{turn}}_j \; \& \; [\textbf{\textit{A}}] \; WIN_i)$$

Thus we can view the predicate *WIN*$_i$ as the smallest fixed-point defined by

$$\mu p \bullet \; (\textbf{\textit{end}} \; \& \; \textbf{\textit{win}}_i) \lor (\textbf{\textit{turn}}_i \; \& \; <\textbf{\textit{E}}> p) \lor (\textbf{\textit{turn}}_j \; \& \; [\textbf{\textit{A}}]p)$$

Van Benthem 2003C claims that game-theoretic equilibria essentially express fixed-points in a general mathematical sense. But which ones, and definable where?

Note in any case that the $\mu$–calculus can also define behaviour of *infinite* branches, by means of modal $\nu$–operators for *greatest fixed-points*. This reflects another strong intuition about games, viz. the infinite-stream-like behaviour of strategies. If I am ill, my strategy is to consult my doctor, and extract an advice. After that, my strategy returns - intuitively - to exactly the same state as before. This suggests that game logics will either involve both types of fixed-point, and may even suggest a co-algebraic treatment of strategies – as has been proposed by Baltag, Moss, Venema  and others.

I feel that existing modal fixed-point languages, or their first-order extensions such as *LFP(FO* (Ebbinghaus & Flum 1995, van Benthem 2004B) provide excellent means for describing interactive game forms, i.e., the structure of moves and abstract outcomes – while preference structure can also be added later without major difficulties. One good way of testing this idea is by looking at existing notions and results in game theory:

♣        *Problem 2*     Do a standard formalization program for key theorems, proofs, and algorithms in game theory, and see which existing logics are necessary.

E.g., De Bruin 2004 analyzes Backward Induction in  a $\mu$–calculus setting, with some atomic propositions added for utility values. Van Benthem 1999– analyzes the proof of the Gale-Stewart Theorem (extending Zermelo's colouring argument to infinite games), identifying its Key Lemma as a law in a temporal logic of players' powers. Harrenstein 2004 provides further game logics (developed jointly with van der Hoek, Meijer, and others) for similar purposes. So, why don't we just use standard logical systems – and

then import what we already know about their deductive apparatus and computational complexity for task like model checking or satisfiability? Why create new game logics? Part of this may just be the New World philosophy mentioned before: 'never keep old clothes when you can buy new ones'. A more respectable part of the new system design, however, is the general 'modal philosophy' in process logic: try to see what simple special-purpose languages do the job of analyzing classes of games, striking a good balance between expressive power and computational complexity.

## *2.3    Adding preferences*

A bare game form only becomes a genuine game with some real drama for rational , or irrational, actors when we look at pay-offs and preferences. For instance, consider the earlier two games for Distribution, but now with the following preferences for players:

> *E*      *p: 0    q: 2    r: 1*
>
> *A*      *p: 1    q: 0    r: 2*

Here are the pairs  (*A*–value, *E*–value)  computed by the usual *BI* algorithm computing node values in a bottom-up manner, starting from the leaves:

| **1, 0** | | |
|---|---|---|
| *1, 0* | *0, 2* | |
| | *0, 2* | *2, 1* |

| **2, 1** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1, 0* | | *2, 1* | |
| *1, 0* | *0, 2* | *1, 0* | *2, 1* |

These numerically annotated trees have roots which predict unique outcomes for the joint behaviour of the players.  And these predictions are different on the two sides!

♣      *Problem 3*    Define good game equivalences when preferences are present.

Further analysis of games with preferences can be done in many ways (van Benthem 1999, JoLLI), but it does need a merge modal dynamic logics with *preference logics*.

♣      *Problem 4*     Integrate game logics with the older preference logics.

I do not see one best formalism yet, but cf. Bonanno 1991, Harrenstein, van der Hoek, Meijer & Witteveen 1999, van der Hoek, van Otterloo & Wooldridge 2004, Pauly 2001, Van Otterloo 2005, and Van Otterloo & Roy 2005 for ongoing attempts. In particular, the latter paper has a perspicuous analysis of Backward Induction arguments with minimal means, viz. a dynamic-preference logic with simple reduction axioms relating backward induction subgames to available future moves. One limitation to all these analyses, however, is the compositional simplicity of Backward Induction, with current best actions built up in terms of those in subtrees lower down.

Logical analyses of more complex game-theoretic solution concepts in a direct modal-dynamic-preference setting are scarce. This will become particularly acute once games with imperfect information are considered (Section 4). But cf. again De Bruin 2004 on extensive games in a 'proof-theoretic' format which achieves greater generality.

***Deontic logic***   Another take on preferences involves so-called *deontic logics* of obligations and permissions. For the standard account of this and other branches of philosophical logic, see the relevant chapter in the *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*. In particular, a deontic statement $O\phi$ says that $\phi$ is true in all 'best' worlds accessible to the present one, with 'best' as seen from the viewpoint of some moral authority. More generally, *conditional obligations $O\phi\psi$* say that

> $\psi$ is true in all the best worlds satisfying the antecedent condition $\phi$.

Now, generalizing the original motivation of deontic logic, one can let the 'authority' vary here – including players in games themselves, who try to achieve best outcomes from their own private perspectives. Deontic logic in its standard guise does not use full-fledged binary comparisons between situations – as in "anything you can do I can do better". But it does suggest other interesting variations of relevance to games!

E.g., van der Meyden 1996 has an account of deontic preferences in dynamic logic as located, not between *worlds*, but between *available actions* in a process. This is the deontic sense in which we can command someone to do something, rather than achieve something – letting the responsability for the resulting world lie with the commander. Likewise, we might say: players' preferences could also lie between moves in a game, not just between their outcome states – and these two perspectives on preference might be complementary, rather than mutually reducible.

♣      *Problem 5*      Integrate deontic logic with dynamic preference logic.

## 2.4    *Rationality assumptions*

The bulk of the mathematics underlying standard game theory consists of a definition of games and Nash equilibrium between strategies, some basic existence theorems for strategic equilibrium due initially to Von Neuman and Nash – and a host of refined notions of equilibrium in the decades after the 1950s, whose proponents tried to zero in more closely on natural or useful equilibria. But there has always been controversy surrounding game-theoretic predictions, or recommendations, as the mathematical model seems too poor to make all relevant considerations explicit. In particular, whether players will play a Backward Induction (*BI*) solution depends on assumptions that underlie their deliberation.  This is well-illustrated in the *Centipede Game*:

$$A \text{———} E \text{———} A \text{———} (2, 3)$$

$$(1, 0) \qquad (0, 2) \qquad (3, 1)$$

Backward Induction predicts that *A* plays *down*, blocking the better right region!

So, which additional assumptions underwrite the *BI* prediction? A famous example is *Rationality*: the statement that every player will always opt for those available moves that make her off best in future play. Much work on game logics is about formalisms defining Rationality and the reasoning based upon it, locking players into the *BI* solution, or whatever other notion of equilibrium may be bolstered by additional assumptions like this. In particular, Aumann has shown a series of results (cf. de Bruin 2004 for an extensive survey and analysis) that, if players have enough common knowledge of rationality in an extensive game, then backward induction must result.

To a first approximation, these characterization arguments require just dynamic-preference logics, as above, for their formalization. And then, their structure turns out to be remarkably similar to earlier arguments found in the philosophy of action. E.g., the famous Practical Syllogism runs as follows from 'Is's to 'Ought's:

> You *can do a* and *b*.
> You *prefer* the outcome of *a* over that of *b*.
> Therefore, you *will do a*.

♣ *Problem 6* Connect the game logic of rationality with the earlier logical tradition in the philosophy of action and practical reasoning.

### 2.5 Epistemic and doxastic logic

Even so, there is much more to rationality analysis for deriving equilibria. One crucial aspect to the whole scenario of deliberation is that players do not know yet what others will do, and what they are going to do themselves. Thus, *knowledge* becomes important, and here is where *epistemic logic* has first entered game theory (cf. Aumann 1976). This requires an expansion of the notion of a game to that of a *model for a game* (Stalnaker 1999), with a space of possible worlds containing different strategy profiles. These models encode players' knowledge about what actions are possible in the usual manner by relations of epistemic indistinguishability. Since this topic takes us into philosophical logic, we postpone further details until Section 4.

More refined models of games in the literature also bring in doxastic structure: i.e., beliefs, and their revision, as well as probabilistic expectations concerning moves and

strategies. Our logical approach to this baroque setting is 'deconstructionist': we start by looking at subsystems of all this, putting the ingredients only together at the end.

### 2.6    Game theory and logic: what good does it do?

Game logics look at fine-structure of games below the usual strategic forms, and they describe step-by-step behaviour over time which remains hidden in the usual strategic equilibria. But what good does this do? There have been deep mathematical existence results for equilibria in games, and on the logic side, there are deep results on meta-properties of first-order, modal, or yet other calculi. Still, the combination of good things does not automatically cook well – witness Churchill's famous response about combining his intelligence with a lady's beauty? But one is of course allowed to hope. Here are a few things that might be expected:

(a)    Systematizing the theory of possible equilibria via their properties as programs

(b)    Cleaning up overly complicated notions of game model, such as 'type spaces'.

(c)    Finding new mathematical results with a certain depth which integrate
        Nash-style equilibrium existence theorems with logical meta-theorems.

Admittedly, beyond logical formalization per se, very little has happened so far in the literature on logic and games justifying these expectations.

♣    *Problem 7*    Do any of the preceding!

### 2.7    Infinite games and temporal logic

For infinite games in extensive form, tree models still suffice – but they suggest other languages in addition to the preceding modal and dynamic ones. In particular, the computational tradition of linear and *branching temporal logics* seems relevant, as these describe universes of branching time where infinite games can unfold. This is the perspective suggested by Fagin et al. 1995, Parikh & Ramanujam 2003 (both with epistemic structure added), Goranko 2001B, and many others. In particular, Halpern 2003 uses the Fagin et al.-style epistemic-temporal modeling of run-based systems to take a fresh look at open issues in game theory. Current expressive game logics of this sort include alternating-time temporal logic (*ATL;* Alur, Henzinger & Kupferman 1998) and its epistemic version *ATEL* (van der Hoek & Wooldridge 2003). Also relevant is the temporal *STIT* formalism of Belnap et al. 2001.

♣    *Problem 8*    Compare and relate existing modal and temporal game logics.

### 2.8    Games in set theory

Infinite games have also played a role in descriptive set theory, where the Gale-Stewart Theorem culminated in 'Martin's Theorem' saying that each infinite two-player game of perfect information is determined, i.e., one of the players has a winning strategy.,

provided the set of winning histories for one of the players lies in the Borel Hierarchy. More foundationally, the Axiom of Determinacy even says that all such games are determined, contradicting the Axiom of Choice and thereby providing an alternative set theory. Loewe 2002, 2003 provide nice links between set theory and game theory, introducing mixed strategy game solutions into the set-theoretic tradition, as well as investigating extended notions of Backward Induction on infinite games, provided that players have suitably simple preference ranking over the possible outcomes.

♣    *Problem 9*    Merge descriptive set theory and game theory of infinite games.

## *2.9    Operations on games*

Another tradition in process logics looks at processes as models identified under some equivalence relation, such as bisimulation, and then studies operations defined on equivalence classes that form new processes out of old. Examples are the operations of *process algebra* (cf. the *Handbook of Process Algebra*, or other official sources), which include Choice, Sequential Composition, as well as Parallel Merges of various kinds, There is also a logical system in this tradition, viz. *linear logic*, whose game semantics (initially started by Andreas Blass; cf. Abramsky & Jagadeesan 1994, Japaridze 1997) studies natural operations on infinite game trees such as

choices $G_1 + G_2$, role switch $G^d$, and parallel compositions $G_1 \bullet G_2$.

Linear logic provides a sort of algebra for dealing with equivalences and implications between complex games – with 'validity' meaning that some designated player *P* has a winning strategy in all games of the given form. Still, these systems were designed to model some pre-given repertoire of operations whose original motivation came from logical proof theory. What happens if we open our mind a priori?

♣    *Problem 10*    What is a natural repertoire of operations on games?

In particular, there are several parallel compositions for playing a number of games 'together'. One would like to have an expressive completeness result for a natural set of game operations, on the analogy of those for process algebra in Hollenberg 1998.

## 3    Strategic Forms and Powers

Next consider the level where we are only interested in players' control over outcomes, without getting ensnared in details of what happens *en route* as the game unfolds. This is related to, but not quite identical with, the standard level of 'strategic forms' – as one might say that strategies, and especially, full-fledged 'game models' based on them – *pre-package* all stepwise developments of the extensive game. The difference would rather be the more 'global' logical languages expressing what we find of interest now.

### 3.1 Powers and game representation

At a coarser level of identification, one looks merely at player's powers. Let's write

$\rho_G{}^i$ s, X      player *i* has a strategy for playing game *G* from *state s*

onward whose resulting states are always in the set *X*

There is some interesting structure at this level of outcome sets. For instance, it is very easy to see that all games satisfy the following two conditions:

*C1*      if $\rho_G{}^i$ s, Y and $Y \subseteq Z$, then $\rho_G{}^i$ s, Z                    *Monotonicity*

*C2*      if $\rho_G{}^A$ s, Y and $\rho_G{}^E$ s, Z, then Y, Z overlap           *Consistency*

Determined two-player games, such as those of Zermelo's Theorem, also satisfy

*C3*      if not $\rho_G{}^A$ s, Y, then $\rho_G{}^E$ s, S–Y;

and the same holds for *E* vis-á-vis *A*                          *Completeness*

Here is a simple converse representation theorem:

*Fact*      Any two families $F_1$, $F_2$ of subsets of some set *S* satisfying *C1, C2, C3*

are the root powers for the two players in some two-step game.

This result concerns games of perfect information: an analogue for games with imperfect information requires just *C1, C2* (van Benthem 2001). The proofs of these representation results show one peculiarity though: it is crucial to be able to have the same outcome at different leaves of the game tree. If we require that each leave in the game tree is a unique outcome, then further principles beyond *C1, C2, C3* will be valid on finite games, and the restriction to two-step games is no longer appropriate. Here is a more technical question for puzzle solvers:

♣      *Problem 11*          Find a representation theorem like the preceding

for players' powers in determined games with unique outcomes.

Much richer calculi of powers for two or more players, based on earlier work in game theory and social choice, are found in the *coalition logics* of Pauly 2001, whose crucial axiom describes how powers of disjoint sets of players combine for their union. Here, too, plausible further axioms emerge when uniqueness of outcomes is assumed. In particular, then, it seems that, in the converse direction, powers of coalitions may be decomposed as conjunctions of weaker powers for their disjoint component sets.


### 3.2 Dynamic game logic

**Modal logic of powers**   At this level of game structure, one can now introduce more global modal languages that deal with players' powers directly, in the following format:

$M, s \models \{G, i\}\phi$ iff there is a set $X$ with $\rho_G\, i\, s, X$ and $\forall s \in X$ $M, s \models \phi$

These are related to so-called 'neighbourhood models' for modal logic (cf. Pauly 2001). This more general semantics differs from the usual relational models and their minimal modal logic mainly in that the new modality $\{\}$ with its $\exists\forall$ clause no longer validates distribution laws over either $\wedge$ or $\vee$.

*Game operations*  This modal language becomes more expressive when we also add *operations* on games to obtain 'dynamic game logic' *DGL* (cf. Parikh 1985). Models $M = (S, \{R_g\}_g, V)$ then stand for 'game boards' with a universe $S$ of states associated with – though not necessarily identical to – nodes in some extensive game, plus hard-wired forcing relations $R_g$ for given atomic games.  Over these structures, appropriate semantic clauses define forcing relations for compound games constructed using sequential composition $G;H$, union (choice) $G \cup H$, game dual $G^d$ (role switch), and finite game iteration $G^*$. Modalities now refer to a game expression:

$\{G, i\}\phi$          $i$ has a strategy making sure game $G$ ends only in states satisfying $\phi$

Typical axioms  validated by this semantics resemble those of *PDL*, such as

$\{G \vee H, i\}\phi \quad \leftrightarrow \{G, i\}\phi \vee \{H, i\}\phi$

$\{G ; H, i\}\phi \quad \leftrightarrow \{G, i\}\{H, i\}\phi$

The characteristic axiom for role switch runs as follows in determined games:

$\{G^d, i\}\phi \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \neg\{G, i\}\neg\phi$

In non-determined games, these principles need to refer to different players explicitly. Cf. Parikh & Pauly 2003 for the state of the art with *DGL*. In particular, the system is completely axiomatizable and decidable without the dual operation. Here is one issue, concerning the latter operation, which has no counterpart in the standard propositional dynamic logic of programs  *PDL*:

♣      *Problem 12*    Axiomatize *DGL* completely with game dual $G^d$ added.

Clearly, the modality $\{\}$ is an existential quantifier over strategies, which are not mentioned explicitly. One obvious question then is how *DGL* relates to more explicit *PDL*-style analysis of games. Van Benthem 1999– suggests a two-pronged approach of game boards in tandem with families of games over them, relating the *DPL*-language over those games with a *DGL* language of the board.

♣      *Problem 13*    Merge *DGL* and *DPL* in some natural way.

***Game algebra*** *DGL*'s main novelty is in terms of *game algebra*. Dynamic game logic encodes the notion $G \approx H$: players have same powers in every concrete interpretation of *G, H* on a game board. Valid principles of game algebra include:

(a)     *De Morgan Algebra* for the choice and dual:
         Boolean Algebra minus its special laws for *0, 1*

(b)     *Relation Algebra* for composition, choice and dual:
         *;* is *associative, left-distributive, right-monotone*,
         and also we have that *(G;H)$^d$ $\approx$ G$^d$;H$^d$*

Typically invalid for games is *right*-distributivity:   *G;(H⋃K)  $\approx$  (G;H) ⋃(G;K).* Complete axiomatizations have been given in Goranko 2001A, Venema 2001. Here is a connection with logic games after all (van Benthem 2003B):

*Theorem*        First-order evaluation games are complete for basic game alg*ebra*.

Lacking here, however, are *parallel* game *o*perations describing simultaneous or joint moves, which go beyond the usual sequential modal or dynamic framework. One natural stipulation for games played concurrently is the following product operation *G x H*, which involves taking ordered pairs of states in both component games:

$$\rho^i{}_{GxH}\,(s,\,t),\,X \quad \text{iff} \quad \exists U\colon \rho^i{}_G\,s,\,U\,,\,\exists V\colon \rho^i{}_H\,t,\,V\colon UxV \subseteq X$$

♣        *Problem 14*     Find the complete game algebra of *DGL* plus product.

### 3.3     Temporal game logics

Games with players' powers can also be described in a temporal language. E.g., van Benthem 1999– identifies this key lemma in the proof of the Gale-Stewart Theorem:

> *{G, E}$\phi$  $\vee$  {G, A} A ¬{G, E}$\phi$*
>
> with *A* the temporal operator "always on the current branch"

This *generalized determinacy* principle holds for all games, and it says that either one player has a winning strategy, or the other has a strategy preventing the first from ever reaching a position where she has a winning strategy.

♣        *Problem 15*
         Axiomatize the temporal logic of  players' powers over arbitrary games.

The branching temporal logic *ATL* used in computer science ((cf. Section 2.7) does part of this job, but it does not seem to have sufficient expressive power.

On the analogy of *DGL*, one would also want to add game operations in this setting. The best known system for that is *linear logic*, as mentioned above.

♣     *Problem 16*     Design and axiomatize a temporal version of linear

logic which can also speak of truth on branches of infinite games.

There are many epistemic versions of temporal logics, such as the earlier-mentioned run-based systems of Fagin et al. 1995, or *ATEL* (van der Hoek & Wooldridge 2003). These also make sense in our current setting. E.g., non-determined games are of the essence in linear logic, and they naturally involve imperfect information (see our next Section 4) and lack of knowledge by players, even in the finite case.

♣     *Problem 17*     Find natural epistemic versions of *DGL* and Linear Logic.

In particular, standard game semantics for linear logics has to use infinite games of perfect information as non-determined counter-examples to Excluded Middle. With game s of imperfect information, finite models might suffice for completeness.

## 4     Knowledge, Belief and Update

As stated in Sections 2.4, 2.5, logics of knowledge, belief, and other paraphernalia of philosophical logic have entered game theory through the analysis of 'rationality' underpinning the choice of specific strategic equilibria. In particular, epistemic logic plays several roles in this connection, and it raises some new questions.

### *4.1     Epistemic characterizations*

First, there is an extensive literature on epistemic characterizations of various game-theoretic notions  of equilibrium, including Iterated Removal of Strictly Dominated Strategies, or Perfect Rationalizability.  The format is as follows:

Model  *M(G)* of game *G* satisfies epistemic condition *E* iff the only strategy

profiles occurring in the model are those satisfying game solution concept *C*.

Often, the condition *E* is some form of iterated or common knowledge of rationality among players. De Bruin 2004 is a thorough  survey, as well as a proposal for a uniform  logical format of analysis for these results. Still, the current literature consists mainly of a small bunch of such characterization results, without  any obvious system.

♣     *Problem 18*     Find a more general  logical analysis of epistemic

characterization results which establish a systematic equilibrium theory.

The full form of such results in game theory usually also involves notions of *belief* and *probability* – where the latter serves both to define equilibria requiring mixed strategies,

and also beliefs of players in the sense of subjective probability. This makes the logical analysis more complex, and it points to further issues below.

## *4.2 Update about the future: knowledge and belief*

The main epistemic characterization results have been about games in strategic form. But knowledge and belief also come up naturally in thinking about player's moves in an extensive game, and their deliberations about the remainder to be played. In this area, one would want to move away from the excessive emphasis on Backward Induction, and consider other scenarios – cf. van Benthem 2004D for some alternatives, such as 'repaying past favours'. Presumably, existing logic of update and revision can handle the game situation, but the issue is what good they can do.

♣     *Problem 19*     Use epistemic update and  belief revision to obtain
a richer set of solution methods for extensive games.

## *4.3 Imperfect information and dynamic-epistemic logic*

Knowledge also prepares the way for games of *imperfect information*, where players do not know their current situation exactly. Card games are a good example, and so is warfare. It is easy to add epistemic structure to games of imperfect information.

***Dynamic-epistemic logic for extensive games***   The usual game-theoretic trees with information sets, or dotted lines, are already models for a combined dynamic-epistemic language combining action modalities *[π]ϕ* with epistemic operators. Here, knowledge assertions occur for both individuals and groups:

$M, s \models K_i \phi$     player $i$ knows that $\phi$ is the case if $\phi$ is true
in all states $i$~indistinguishable from $s$

$M, s \models C_G \phi$     $\phi$ is common knowledge in the group $G$ if
$\phi$ is true  in all states reachable from $s$ by a finite
sequence of accessibility steps for any player.

This is a modal language again, but now over models consisting of worlds with equivalence relations for players' indistinguishabilities, and typical interactions.  Much is known about this system in the standard modal literature.

A combined dynamic-epistemic language *DEL* can describe many situations of interest. The following is a brief survey of van Benthem 2001, which explains the *DEL* view of imperfect information games for both extensive and strategic forms. For the sake of concrete illustration, consider the following two-step game:

Allowing only strategies that can be played despite her uncertainty, *E* has only two: 'left', 'right'. Note that determinacy is lost here: neither player has a winning strategy. The following formulas describe player *E*'s plight at her right-most turn:

(a)     $K_E(<l>win_E \vee <r> win_E)$

   *E* knows that some move will make her win

(b)     $\neg K_E <l>win_E) \wedge \neg K_E <r>win_E)$

   there is no particular move of which *E* knows that it will make her win.

The complete logic of this system is a well-known fusion of *PDL* plus epistemic *S5*. It has been proposed by Moore 1985 as a logic of *planning* in situations where agents do not know all the relevant information. In particular, no interaction axioms occur between knowledge and action modalities. When these occur, they express special features of agents. This is brought out by standard modal *correspondence* analysis.

*Theorem*     The *DEL* formula $K_E[a]\phi \rightarrow [a]K_E\phi$ is true in a frame
            iff *E* has Perfect Recall in the sense that, if $R_a\,xy$ and
            $y \sim_E z$, then there exists a *u* with $x \sim_E u$ and $R_a\,uz$:

The latter condition requires this commutative diagram in the game trees:



More complex versions of Perfect Recall yield to exactly the same analysis (Bonanno 2003). And one can also analyze other types of player, such as those having finite-state memories. One virtue of logic analysis here is the discovery that complexity of valid reasoning may differ widely for these different types of agent (Halpern & Vardi 1989). Here are two questions about further possible connections with game theory:

♣     *Problem 20*    Use *DEL* to analyse the various notions of game-theoretic equilibrium that have been proposed for imperfect information games.


♣     *Problem 21*     The 'Harsanyi trade-off' relates incomplete information about the future for players in perfect information games with games of

imperfect information. Analyze this reduction in logical *DEL* terms.

***Uniform strategies***   One can also add a calculus of strategies again, in a *PDL*-style extension. In game theory, imperfect information games involve *uniform strategies*, which prescribe the same move for a player across her uncertainty link. These can be correlated with programs whose only test conditions are formulas which the relevant players know. Cf. Fagin et al. 1995 on 'knowledge programs' for this purpose, or the definability result for uniform strategies in van Benthem 2001.

***Knowledge and powers***   *DEL* also has a counterpart at the *outcome level*. As we noted above, any two families of sets satisfying only the monotonicity and consistency conditions on powers  can be realized by means of a two-step *imperfect* information game. Here is an example displaying the necessary tricks. Suppose we are given:

  powers for **E**   *{A, B, C}, {C, D}*       powers for **A**   *{B, C}, {A, D}*

An appropriate game with just these powers  is



But the language of powers, or even the full *DGL* of Section 3 can be easily combined with epistemic logic. In a sense (van Benthem 2001), Hintikka's '*IF* logic' of Section 5 below is already a calculus of game operations plus implicit knowledge operators.

## *4.4    Information update in games*

***Concrete epistemic actions***   'Dynamic epistemic logic' is also used in another sense these days for concrete systems that update information (cf. Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998). Van Benthem 2005B is an extensive survey of open problems in this area. Here, we just mention a few issues specifically related to games. For the purposes of this Section, we use the letter combination *EDL* for this second sense of dynamics, which may be viewed as an instantiation of *DEL* in the above more abstract sense. One now adds *PDL* style operators referring to concrete informational actions. The basic case is *public announcement  !A* of a proposition *A*, removing all worlds from the current model **M** where *A* does not hold to obtain the relativized submodel **M**|*A*:

  **M**, *s* |= *[!A]* $\phi$         iff      **M**|*A*, *s* |= $\phi$

This says that, after truthful announcement of $A$, $\phi$ holds. Public announcement has a complete decidable logic (cf. van Benthem, van Eijck & Kooi 2005 for an up-to-date version), whose axioms essentially compute *[!A]$\phi$* by *relativizing* $\phi$ to $A$.

More complex informative events over an epistemic model ***M*** involve hiding of one's own actions, or partial observation by others. This happens frequently in ordinary communication, where we whisper in lecture theatres, use *bcc* in emails to make information flow in complex manners, or just cheat... A sharp focus for all this are *parlour games* where not all players can see all details of some current move – cf. van Ditmarsch 2000 on the logical analysis of 'knowledge games' of this kind.

***Product update via event models*** To deal with such more sophisticated informative events, the right update mechanism is not just world elimination, but rather a product of the current epistemic model ***M*** with some new dynamic structure.

One first takes an *event model* ***A*** consisting of all relevant actions with the preconditions for their occurrence, while encoding also which agent can distinguish which events. E.g., if I read my card in your view, you know that I am performing one of a number of possible reading actions, but you do not know which one. And If I read my card secretly, you even think my action is the same as doing nothing.

The next stage then computes a *product model **MxA*** whose worlds are pairs *(s, a)* of current states *s* in ***M*** and those events *a* from ***A*** which are possible at *s* (Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998). For game trees, this product construction specializes as follows:

> Take a game with current state *x*, and uncertainty relations $\sim_i$ among
> the nodes at *x*'s tree level computed so far. Let a new move be made.
> The new states are the nodes at the next level of the game tree, which
> can be identified with ordered pairs (previous state, action last made).
> Now we define the uncertainties at the next tree level as follows:
>
> $(y, b) \sim_i (z, c)$   iff   $y \sim_i z$  and  $b \sim_i c$

Thus, new uncertainty equals 'old uncertainty + indistinguishable actions'.

*Example*        Updates during play: propagating ignorance along a game tree



Game Tree                         Action Diagram

Here are the successive updates:

stage 1

stage 2

stage 3

One can analyze this update mechanism by its dynamic-epistemic properties. For product update, we find two major ingredients, the earlier *Perfect Recall*, and

> *Uniform No Learning*   If two actions are ever indistinguishable,
> then they will never make indistinguishable states distinguishable.

Uniform No Learning typically validates a converse of the earlier knowledge-action interchange law for players who obey it (van Benthem 2001). Note that this means that product update is not a neutral stipulation: it only works for idealized agents.

***Evolution in the Update Universe***   The impact of product update, in whatever formulation, may be studied in the following mathematical setting.  One considers a process universe of infinite trees whose nodes are finite sequences of events (cf. Fagin et al. 1995, Parikh & Ramanujam 2003), and allows arbitrary uncertainty relations for agents between nodes. Such uncertainty patterns will encode what agents know, and more generically, what types of agent are present. One important special kind of such trees then arises from product update. Define the infinite tree-like structure

> *Tree(**M**, **A**)* to consist of all successive product levels   *M, MxA, (MxA)xA*, ...

The above game tree was an example. Now we can ask which patterns of epistemic uncertainty relations are characteristic for the latter setting. Van Benthem & Liu 2004 give the following representation result:

*Theorem*       An arbitrary epistemic event tree is isomorphic to some
             model  *Tree(**M**, **A**)*  iff its uncertainty relations for all agents
             satisfy both Perfect Recall and Uniform No Learning.

The same paper also discusses the possibility of a classification of agents' *strategies* in terms of restrictions on their format of definability.

General epistemic trees support epistemic temporal languages, as much as dynamic epistemic logics of information update (van Benthem 2004C is a first attempt):

♣      *Problem 22*     Can the theory of *EDL* be generalized to an epistemic temporal

logic allowing more general temporal pre- and postconditions for events?

Yap 2005 is a first attempt in this direction.

### 4.5     *Diversity of agents*

The preceding characterization result can be extended to other types of agent, corresponding to other structural constraints. E.g., van Benthem 2001 characterizes the dynamic-epistemic properties corresponding to *memory-free agents*:

♣      *Problem 23*      Find a general *EDL*-style classification of types of

agent based on logically expressible dynamic-epistemic constraints.

Perhaps the more interesting question, however, is what happens with groups of agents with different logical behaviour. How do we detect the 'memory-type' of an opponent, and can we take advantage of it, once we know? The recent movie "Memento" provides nice examples of this scenario, and so do many other more *SF*-like current films.

### 4.6     *Other uses of EDL: solution algorithms for strategic games*

Another striking aspect of games is the dynamic-epistemic character of the usual solution procedures. Notably, Iterated Removal of Strictly Dominated Strategies ($SD^\omega$) successively removes rows and columns from game matrices to arrive at a submodel of the full set of strategy profiles where common knowledge of rationality reigns.

Van Benthem 2003C uses repeated announcement of rationality assertions for players to analyze game solutions, not as sets of strategy profiles, but rather directly on the algorithmic procedures themselves which solve games. This works over a simple account of *game models* as sets of strategy profiles where players know their own action, but not that of the others. Standard algorithms iteratively eliminate profiles from the initial model, in a process whose steps can be viewed as announcements of some suitable epistemic statement. In any model *M*, any statement $\phi$, repeated sufficiently often, gets to a fixed-point *#(M, $\phi$)*. Now, either the latter submodel is empty ($\phi$ is then *self-defeating*), or it is non-empty, while announcing it has no further effect, so that the statement has become common knowledge in *#(M, $\phi$)* ($\phi$ is *self-fulfilling*).

*Theorem*      The algorithm $SD^\omega$ of Iterated Removal of Strictly Dominated

Strategies produces just the models *#(M, WR)* where *WR* is the statement

that no one plays an action for which there is one that she knows to be better.

This type of result establishes a correspondence between (a) epistemic assertions whose announcement can be iterated, and (b) game solution algorithms. Van Benthem

2003C gives an illustration, defining a new solution algorithm stronger than $SD^\omega$ using the new statement that "no one thinks that her current action is ever a worst response".

♣ *Problem 24* Develop the dynamic epistemic analysis
of game solution procedures more systematically.

As for the logical background of these scenarios, for iterated existential epistemic assertions $\phi$, the domains of the solution models #($\mathbf{M}$, $\phi$) can be defined explicitly inside the initial model by greatest fixed-point formulas in an *epistemic µ–calculus*. But the general case requires an extension with *inflationary fixed-points*. Now, the general language of epistemic inflationary fixed-point logic is ill-behaved. E.g., it is undecidable (Dawar, Grädel & Kreutzer 2004) and other quirks occur, too.

♣ *Problem 25* Find well-behaved fragments of epistemic
inflationary fixed-point logic which suffice for game analysis.

*4.7 Belief revision*

*EDL* may be viewed also as a logic for update of *belief*, rather than knowledge. Nothing much changes on a doxastic interpretation of its language, semantics, or logical laws as describing players' beliefs about moves and their effects. For instance,

♣ *Problem 26* Extend the analysis of game solution with iterated epistemic
statements to a scenario where players' beliefs are taken into account.

But, in the context of games, we also need *belief revision*, as we encounter unexpected behaviour of our opponents contradicting our expectations so far (cf. Gärdenfors & Rott 1995). Now, as explained in van Benthem 2005C, doxastic product update does not perform belief revision: contradictory new evidence leads to inconsistent belief. But its methodology can be extended to a system which does, by enriching models with *plausibility values* for worlds according to agents (Spohn 1988). Then, product update can be extended to plausibility update in a natural manner (Aucher 2003), supporting the same sorts of perspicuous logics which are the trade-mark of *EDL*.

Still, there is a difference in spirit. As pointed out in Liu 2004, *diversity of revision policies* (from more radical to more conservative) is a desideratum in belief revision theory, and hence no unique update rule can work for everyone. Her proposal is then to parametrize the plausibility assignment function to pairs *(s, a)* with weight for the past world *s* and the last-observed event *a*. This is like parametrized update rules in inductive logic or Bayesian probability.

♣ *Problem 27* Apply the Spohn-Aucher-Liu analysis to extensive games.

***Long-term learning*** Viewed in the long run, belief revision becomes a special case of *learning strategies* over time. The time seems ripe for a merge between temporal logic (cf. Sections 3.3, 4.4), systems of update and belief revision, and the game perspective on learning developed , e.g., in Kelly 1996. After all, a {Student, Teacher} class-room setting is very much like a two-person game. Learning agents over time have been considered in Kelly 2002, Hendricks 2002. The above detailed level of local moves and their effects in extensive games seems relevant here, but so does the more global analysis in terms of powers, and general topological structure of sets of runs.

♣ *Problem 28* Find a merge between belief revision, learning theory, and temporal logic. In particular, are there significant completeness theorems capturing non-trivial properties of learning mechanisms in logical terms?

## *4.8 Preference Dynamics*

While we are dynamifying various aspects of games, we might also consider doing the same with preferences. One might imagine that there are actions which change preferences. Zarnic 1999 analyses goals and planning in this way, with commands of the form *FIAT $\phi$:* "make $\phi$ become the case". Yamada 2004 takes the same thinking to *deontic logic*. A command like "you ought to make sure that $\phi$"is some authority's instruction to give possible future outcomes satisfying $\phi$ high(er) priority. (Related ideas are found in Tan & van der Torre 1998.) Thus, one can have an account of dynamic commands and their effects in the same style as *EDL*. But still, there are non-trivial issues here, having to do with the fact that *EDL* events are 'precondition oriented'. They convey information about the situation when the event *took place*, following which we just see or deduce what will hold afterwards – perhaps after a change took place. By contrast, most commands are *postcondition-oriented*. They tell us to do something that will make sure that a certain condition will hold afterwards.

♣ *Problem 29* Develop a complete expressive dynamic logic of commands.

## 5 Logic Games

As mentioned in Section 1, many logical key tasks themselves have a game character. Most of these involve two-person zero-sum games of perfect information, some with finite extensive game trees, some allowing infinite runs. Van Benthem 1999–, 2002C have chapters on most of the basic varieties.  We run through a few basic cases.

### 5.1 Standard logic games

***Evaluation games*** Semantic evaluation games exist for most logical languages. The original case are Hintikka's evaluation games between a Verifier and a Falsifier for formulas of first-order logic, whose basic feature is an equivalence between

(a)   truth of $\phi$ in some model **M** with assignment *s*,

(b)   the existence of a *winning strategy* for Verifier

   in the associated evaluation game *game(M, s, $\phi$)*.

These games have a finite length measured by the quantifier depth of the formula. With this bridge, many logical and game-theoretic notions can be correlated. E.g., the game-theoretic import of Excluded Middle is that evaluation games are *determined* by Zermelo's Theorem. More complex games are needed for more expressive languages, such as *LFP(FO)* with monotone fixed-point operators. These involve infinite runs, and counting of parity of infinitely recurring $\mu$– or $\nu$–subformulas.

♣   *Problem 30*   Find a systematic logical use for the surplus information in
   the game  account, viz. the different specific winning strategies for players.

♣   *Problem 31*   Develop an abstract model theory of logical
   languages based on a natural classification of game types..

***Model construction games***   Games for constructing models exist in great variety (cf. Hodges 1985). One simple option is to turn *semantic tableaus* into logic games (van Benthem 2005B). Now there can be infinite runs, corresponding to the construction of an infinite model. The tableau rules and processing procedure can be manipulated in many different ways for this. Here a model exists for a given set of statements iff Builder has a winning strategy, and different such strategies even encode different possible models directly. This setting also suggests introducing new vocabulary, such as an explicit instruction for dealing with a true universal quantifier more than once. Here is a question which arises then:

♣   *Problem 32*   Use variations on tableau games to model various
   substructural (categorial, linear) versions of first-order logic.

***Proof games and argumentation***   The oldest logic games are Lorenzen's for dialogue, where the main result is that sequents are intuitionistically provable iff the Proponent of the conclusion has a winning strategy against an Opponent granting the premises. Even more constructively, there is an effective correspondence between

(a)   *proofs*,

(b)   *winning strategies* in the dialogue game.

These dialogue systems are driven by a mixture of 'logical rules' for decomposing complex statements, and 'procedural rules' setting the schedule and determining other

points of order. More informal versions of Lorenzen games, with both features, are used in modern argumentation theory, as a model for rational debate.

♣      *Problem 33*    Analyse the procedural component of dialogue games
more systematically, and find a systematic prediction what logic
comes out of what package of logical and procedural rules.

As finding proofs is the dual of looking for counter-examples, there is also

♣      *Problem 34*    Compare dialogue games with model construction games,
and also the co-existence of strategies-as-proofs and strategies-as-models.

By the way, van Benthem 2004A has a more gloomy game analysis of argumentation, as involving little logic, but rather a calculus of values of arguments decreasing with familiarity, and making one's statements, whether weak or strong, with the right timing.

***Model comparison games***     The most widely used logic games are Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games of model comparison, where two models *M*, *N* satisfy the same first-order sentences up to quantifier depth *k* iff the player called Duplicator has a winning strategy against the counter-player Spoiler in the game *comp(M, N, k)* over *k* rounds. Here, the concrete correspondence is between

      (a)     first-order formulas distinguishing the models, and
      (b)     winning strategies for the 'difference player' Spoiler.

Comparison games give fine-structure to more global structural equivalences such as isomorphism, potential isomorphism, or bisimulation. Thus, we could also use them to compare extensive games! Here we just mention a technical question related to the strong logical systems that we have advocated for analyzing general games:

♣      *Problem 35*    Find a useful comparison game matching first-order logic
with fixed-points *LFP(FO).*

One intriguing thing is that model comparison games measure similarity of structures. Thus, one can play such games to study similarity between general games!

***Operations on logic games***    Other logic games include more complex constructions, such as model extension (Hirsch and Hodkinson 2002) or recursion-theoretic priority arguments (Moschovakis 1980). Many of these, intuitively, involve combination of subgames into larger games. Some of these combinations are the earlier-mentioned choices, compositions, and role switches. But others involve more complex forms of parallel product formation. Here is an illustration from van Benthem 1999–:

*Theorem*      Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé games are isomorphic to
        'interleaved products'  of Hintikka evaluation games.

♣      *Problem 36*    Find a good typology of game operations used for logic games.

## 5.2    Modified logic games

Next, even though logic games have largely developed in isolation from game theory proper, there have been some cultural influences from game theory coming this way.

***Imperfect information***    Logic games with imperfect information have been proposed by Hintikka and the '*IF* school' (Hintikka & Sandu 1997) for the purpose of analysing more freely scoped quantifier languages, with motivations from linguistics, philosophy, mathematics, and these days even quantum mechanics.  Here is the well-known 'slash notation' for such a new kind of logical evaluation game:

$\forall x\ \exists y/\boldsymbol{x}\ x{\neq}y$.

This expresses, when played in any model ***M***, that Verifier has a uniform strategy for winning this semantic game, even when she does not know the value of $x$ chosen earlier by her opponent Falsifier. At the level of powers, this game is equivalent to the reverse scope order $\exists y\ \forall x/\boldsymbol{y}\ Rxy$. This observation is just one instance of general *IF* logic,  for which we refer to Sandu & Tulenheimo 2005 (cf. also Dechesne 2005). In particular, the full power of the system is equivalent to that of existential second-order logic. But Tulenheimo 2004 shows that some *IF* variants of modal logic remain decidable. In addition to the host of more specialized questions in this technical area, we mention

♣      *Problem 37*    What is the complete game algebra of *IF* logic?

♣      *Problem 38*    What are natural decidable fragments of the *IF* language?

The *IF* move from sequential to uniform strategies makes sense for any logic game.

♣      *Problem 39*    Develop *IF* versions of games of proof or model comparison.

***Preferences***    Finally, one can also add more finer preferences to logic games, and introduce more sophisticated equilibria than just those far, being 'winning strategy versus any counter-play '. Harrenstein 2004 develops some quite original extensions of logical notions of consequence along these lines.  Other possibilities abound:

(a)      Measure *effort*, in making branch length to end node
        an additional factor in the pay-offs for players.

(b)      Form new games out of existing logical tasks.

A good source for the latter additional structure is computing updates, as in Section 4. Parts of the update universe can be turned into *conversation games* with a restricted set of available assertions (cf. van Otterloo 2005), where the point is for one player to be the first to find out the actual world. Nash values for these games can be hard to compute, as complexity increases quickly. Winning strategies clearly have something to do with solving the *Reachability Problem* from one epistemic model to another by a sequence of admissible actions satisfying certain epistemic assertions.

♣      *Problem 40*      Develop a general theory of conversation games.

## 6      Further Topics

This survey of issues and questions, broad as it is, has still left out a number of issues that are crucial to games. We conclude by merely listing a few directions:

***Probability***      All of the above needs to be integrated with probability theory, in particular, Bayesian update (cf. van Benthem 2003A for general product update in this setting). One good reason is that game solutions in general involve probabilistic *mixed strategies* in an essential way as admissible forms of behaviour. This trend is also emerging, interestingly, in *IF* logic with Hintikka's use of 'generalized Skolem functions' (cf. van Benthem 2004C) to deal with quantum-mechanical particles whose positions and moments satisfy the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.

***Infinite and evolutionary games***      Infinitely repeated games are essential in modern game theory, starting from Axelrod's famous work on the emergence of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma encounters, and continuing into modern evolutionary game theory (cf. Skyrms 2004). A systematic connection between such games and those found in logic seems rewarding. E.g., how does the strategy calculus of infinite linear logic games, with its emphasis on 'memory-free strategies' like Copy-Cat (i.e., Tit-for-Tat in Axelrod's account) or finite-automaton computable strategies relate to similar topics in game theory? More generally, evolutionary game theory turns around the mathematics of *dynamical systems* – and its relationship with epistemic temporal and update logics seems a potentially important short-term/long-term interface.

***Joint action***      Games naturally involve collective behaviour. Just as epistemic logic has moved to considering knowledge of *groups* which need not be reducible to knowledge of individuals, it makes sense to look at group action per se. Compare also the philosophical tradition on shared agency (Bratman 1993), which addresses congenial issues. Coalition logics do part of this job, but there is much more potential structure to collective action and collective information than what has been considered so far.

## 7     Conclusion

This concludes our survey of current directions and open problems at the interface of logic and game theory. If all of this comes together in a meaningful way, we would have a broad theory of interaction and information that should be of interest to logicians, game theorists, computer scientists, and philosophers.

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