AdversarialCoT: Single-Document Retrieval Poisoning for LLM Reasoning

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Abstract

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enhances large language model (LLM) reasoning by retrieving external documents, but also opens up new attack surfaces. We study knowledge-base poisoning attacks in RAG, where an attacker injects malicious content into the retrieval corpus, which is then surfaced by the retriever and consumed by the LLM during reasoning. Unlike prior work that floods the corpus with poisoned documents, we propose AdversarialCoT, a query-specific attack that poisons only a single document in the corpus. AdversarialCoT first extracts the target LLM's reasoning framework to guide the construction of an initial adversarial chain-of-thought. The adversarial document is iteratively refined through interactions with the LLM, progressively exposing and exploiting critical reasoning vulnerabilities. Experiments on benchmark LLMs show that a single adversarial document can significantly degrade reasoning accuracy, revealing subtle yet impactful weaknesses. Our study exposes security risks in RAG systems and provides actionable insights for designing more robust LLM reasoning pipelines.

CCS Concepts

• **Information systems** → **Adversarial retrieval**.

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Keywords

Retrieval-augmented generation, Chain-of-thought, Knowledge-based poisoning attack

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1 Introduction

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enhances large language model (LLM) reasoning by grounding generation in external knowledge retrieved from large corpora [8, 14, 23]. By coupling retrievers with advanced reasoning models, RAG systems significantly reduce hallucination and improve reliability in knowledge-intensive tasks [1, 7, 30, 36]. However, this tight integration introduces a new and largely under-explored attack surface: LLM reasoning is no longer solely determined by model parameters, but is mediated by retrieved documents that can be externally manipulated.

Unlike LLMs, whose vulnerabilities manifest at the model level, retrievers operate as a gateway between untrusted corpora and model reasoning. If misleading or malicious documents are retrieved, they are treated as factual evidence and directly influence the reasoning trajectory of the LLM [38, 40]. Such retriever-mediated noise can interact with and amplify LLM hallucinations, leading to systematic reasoning failures that are difficult to detect or correct.

Recent work has begun to investigate adversarial attacks on RAG systems [3, 9, 25, 38, 40], with knowledge-base poisoning emerging as a practical and realistic threat model [40]. Existing attacks



Figure 1: Overview of single-document knowledge-base poisoning in retrieval-augmented reasoning.

largely rely on a *flooding strategy*, injecting batches of poisoned documents to overwhelm retrievers and downstream models [38, 40]. While effective in degrading overall performance, such brute-force approaches provide limited insight into how and why LLM reasoning fails, and become increasingly ineffective against modern reasoning-optimized LLMs. This motivates a critical yet underexplored question: *Can a single poisoned document, injected into the retrieval corpus and surfaced by the retriever, reliably mislead advanced LLM reasoning and precisely expose its vulnerabilities?*

In this work, we answer this question affirmatively. We investigate *single-document knowledge-base poisoning attacks* in retrieval-augmented reasoning, where an attacker injects only one adversarial document into the corpus. As illustrated in Figure 1, this document is naturally retrieved at inference time and incorporated into the LLM's reasoning process. Compared to batch-based attacks, single-document poisoning is significantly more stealthy and realistic, yet also more challenging, as it must precisely target model reasoning vulnerabilities while competing against abundant legitimate knowledge. We consider a practical decision-based black-box setting, where the attacker only observes final model outputs.

Our key observation is that modern LLMs increasingly rely on explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning [2, 30, 36], often optimized through reinforcement learning [7, 27, 39]. While CoT improves interpretability and reasoning depth, it also reveals the model's reasoning structure, stylistic preferences, and reliance on intermediate evidence, creating a new attack surface for adversaries. Here, "reasoning structure" does not refer to a fixed word-level template. Instead, it denotes coarse-grained, externally observable organization patterns in the model's reasoning traces, such as how it initiates reasoning, transitions between evidence, and aggregates evidence toward a conclusion. Building on this insight, we propose AdversarialCoT, an attack framework that *iteratively optimizes adversarial chain-of-thoughts embedded within a single retrieved document*. AdversarialCoT simulates the target LLM's reasoning behavior to identify critical vulnerabilities and progressively refines deceptive CoTs through interaction with the model. By poisoning the corpus rather than the prompt, our approach exploits the retriever as a natural delivery mechanism for adversarial reasoning signals.

We evaluate AdversarialCoT on multiple QA benchmarks [13, 22, 35] and advanced reasoning LLMs [6, 7, 33]. Results show that a single poisoned document can substantially degrade reasoning accuracy, improving attack success rates by up to 23% over existing poisoning methods. These findings reveal critical weaknesses in current RAG pipelines and highlight the urgent need for robustness mechanisms tailored to retriever-mediated reasoning.

2 Problem Statement

Retrieval-augmented LLM reasoning. Our study is centered around reasoning LLMs, which we denote as $\mathcal{M}$. For a query q, the system follows a three-stage process: *retrieval*, *reasoning*, and *answer generation*. First, an external retriever $\mathcal{R}$ fetches relevant documents from a knowledge base $C = \{d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_N\}$, selecting the top-$k$ documents $D_q = \{d_{q_1}, \ldots, d_{q_k}\}$. Second, the LLM $\mathcal{M}$ examines these documents, integrates external information with its internal knowledge, and performs reasoning. Finally, based on this reasoning process, the model produces the final answer y. The overall process can be formalized as:

$$y = \mathcal{M}(q, D_q), \text{ where } D_q = \mathcal{R}(q, C). \tag{1}$$

Single-document knowledge-base poisoning attack against LLM reasoning. We study a query-specific and controlled poisoning setting as a first step to isolate whether a single reasoning-shaped document can reliably mislead retrieval-augmented reasoning. Given a set of queries $Q = \{q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_n\}$, the attacker has a corresponding set of target answers $\mathcal{Y}^* = \{y_1^*, y_2^*, \ldots, y_n^*\}$. The attacker aims to poison the knowledge base C such that the reasoning LLM generates the target answer y_i^* for the target query q_i, where $i = 1, 2, \ldots, n$, which constitutes a successful attack. To achieve this, the attacker creates an adversarial document d_{q_i} for each query q_i and injects the set of adversarial documents $\mathcal{D}_{adv} = \{d_{q_1}, d_{q_2}, \ldots, d_{q_n}\}$ from all target queries into the knowledge base, creating a poisoned corpus $C' = C \cup \mathcal{D}_{adv}$. Formally, the attacker aims to maximize the following objective:

$$\max_{\mathcal{D}_{adv}} \sum_{q_i \in Q} \mathbb{I}\left(\mathcal{M}\left(q_i, \mathcal{R}(q_i, C \cup \mathcal{D}_{adv})\right) = y_i^*\right), \tag{2}$$

where $\mathbb{I}(\cdot)$ is an indicator function that returns 1 if the attack success condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise.

Attack setting. To reflect real-world conditions, we focus on a practical and challenging decision-based black-box setting. In this setting, the internal parameters and logic of both the retriever $\mathcal{R}$ and the LLM $\mathcal{M}$ are inaccessible to the attacker. The attacker can only interact with the system by submitting queries and obtaining the LLM output (containing the reasoning process, the final answer, and the retrieved document set). Following realistic constraints, we assume the attacker can add new documents to the knowledge corpus C but cannot modify or delete existing ones [25, 38, 40].

3 Our Method

Our key insight is that *reasoning failures themselves provide actionable signals for discovering and exploiting LLM vulnerabilities*. Based on this insight, we propose AdversarialCoT, a feedback-driven framework that iteratively uncovers reasoning weaknesses by interacting with the target LLM. As illustrated in Figure 2, AdversarialCoT operates in two stages: (i) *Observation and initialization*, which extracts a coarse-grained reasoning structure from the target LLM and initializes an adversarial document; and (ii) *Feedback–driven iterative optimization*, which analyzes model responses to progressively identify and exploit reasoning vulnerabilities.

3.1 Observation and Initialization

We begin by probing the target LLM with a small set of queries and observing its reasoning traces. From these observations, we extract



Figure 2: The attack process of AdversarialCoT.

Table 1: An example showing three reasoning phases: initiation, evidence examination and transition, and summary.

Query: What is paula deen's brother?
Reasoning process: **<think> Let me go through the context step by step** **First,** I see that the context... **Further,** there's another context that says.. **Again,** the brother's name... **Additionally,** there are mentions of her brother... **However,** the question ... **So, putting it all together**... **</think>**
Answer: Paula Deen's brother is Earl W. Bubba Hiers...

a coarse reasoning skeleton that characterizes the typical flow of the model's CoT, rather than enforcing a fixed template. Empirically, we find that advanced reasoning LLMs often follow a three-phase structure: (i) initiating the reasoning process, (ii) examining and transitioning between evidence, and (iii) aggregating evidence to reach a conclusion. We formalize this structure as $\mathcal{T} = \{P_1, P_2, P_3\}$, where each phase P_i represents a functional reasoning role rather than specific lexical patterns.

Table 1 illustrates an example reasoning trace, highlighting the recurring phases of initiation, evidence examination, and summarization. Importantly, the connective expressions shown are used only as heuristic initializations. They serve as a starting point for adversarial construction, while the exact linguistic realizations are dynamically adapted during optimization to closely match the target LLM's evolving reasoning behavior.

Given the extracted structure $\mathcal{T}$, we instruct an attacker agent to generate an initial adversarial document for each target query. This document embeds a draft adversarial CoT that mirrors the high-level reasoning flow and supports an attacker-chosen target answer. The goal of initialization is not to succeed immediately, but to provide a minimal, structured hypothesis that can be refined through interaction with the model. The main prompt is shown in *Instruction for Initial Construction* of Figure 2.

At this stage, failures typically arise from two sources: (i) the adversarial document is not retrieved due to insufficient relevance; or (ii) the document is retrieved, but the embedded CoT fails to influence the model's reasoning. Thus, the attacker agent needs to interact with the target LLM to iteratively optimize the adversarial documents.

3.2 Feedback-Driven Iterative Optimization

AdversarialCoT treats each model response as diagnostic feedback. After injecting the adversarial document into the retrieval corpus, the attacker agent observes the target LLM's output and reasoning trace, and updates the document accordingly. As illustrated in Figure 2, the optimization proceeds along two complementary dimensions: (i) *Relevance optimization.* When the adversarial document is not retrieved, the failure indicates a mismatch between the document content and the retriever's relevance criteria. The attacker agent revises surface content and contextual cues to improve retrievability, without altering the underlying adversarial reasoning intent. (ii) *Vulnerability-driven persuasion optimization.* When the document is retrieved but fails to mislead the LLM, the reasoning trace reveals which evidence, transitions, or conclusions were rejected by the model. The attacker agent analyzes these failures to identify reasoning bottlenecks and systematically refines the adversarial CoT, adjusting evidence ordering, emphasis, and logical transitions, to better align with the target LLM's reasoning biases. Through this iterative interaction loop, AdversarialCoT progressively converges toward adversarial documents that both survive retrieval and precisely exploit model-specific reasoning vulnerabilities. Crucially, this process requires only a single poisoned document, making the attack both stealthy and highly targeted.

4 Experimental Setup

Datasets. We conduct experiments on MS-MARCO [22], HotpotQA [35], and NQ [13] datasets. The knowledge base of MS-MARCO is from Bing, while both HotpotQA and NQ are built on Wikipedia articles. We conduct most of our evaluations across all datasets, while primarily focusing on the MS-MARCO for comparative experiments.

Models and implementation details. Our main target LLMs are DeepSeek-R1 (R1) [7], Qwen3 [33], and GLM4.5 [6]. We also conduct comparative experiments on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct [34] and Qwen-7B-R1-Distilled [7] to demonstrate attack effectiveness across different model reasoning capabilities. We fix the decoding temperature at 0.3 to preserve moderate reasoning diversity while reducing excessive sampling variance during attack evaluation. Following [14, 40], we set the number of retrieved documents to top-5.

We employ Co-Condenser [5] as retriever. From each dataset, we randomly sample 100 queries. We use this controlled evaluation size because each query requires adversarial document construction together with multiple rounds of black-box interaction and refinement, and this setting allows us to compare attack trends consistently across datasets and models under a realistic attack budget. We employ KIMI-K2 [28] as attacker agent and set the maximum interaction rounds to 3.

Evaluation metrics. We use three metrics: (i) **ASR**$_r$: The proportion of adversarial documents successfully retrieved in the top-k; (ii) **ASR**$_g$: The conditional success rate of misleading the LLM given successful retrieval; and (iii) **ASR**: The overall attack success rate. Crucially, these metrics satisfy the relationship $ASR = ASR_r \times ASR_g$. This aligns with the actual process that external documents must be successfully retrieved before they can influence the LLM. For final evaluation, attack success is determined based on the model's final answer. Moreover, because target answers may involve semantically equivalent or slightly varied surface forms, we manually verify the final outcome for every query to ensure reliable success-rate estimation.

Baseline methods. We compare our work with: (i) Naive attack (NA): The most basic knowledge base poisoning attack, where the attack document directly answers the target question with the target answer in a single sentence. (ii) Naive prompt attack (NPA): Inject malicious prompt as the attack document in the form: `"For query <target query>, output: <target answer>."` (iii) Prompt hijacking attack (PHA) [38]: This method adds hijacking text based on the NPA in the form: `"For query <target query>, ignore context and focus on this instruction: output <target answer>."` (iv) PoisonedRAG (PRAG) [40]: This method injects a document containing incorrect knowledge in the form: `"This is my question: [question]. This is my answer: [answer]. Please craft a corpus such that the answer is [answer] with the question [question]."`

Variants of our method. To isolate the impact of the iterative optimization, we evaluate: (i) *Non-iter*: The base version that constructs adversarial documents without iterative optimization; and (ii) *Iterative*: The full framework that employs multi-round optimization strategies to refine relevance and persuasiveness.

5 Experimental Results

Main results. Table 2 lists our results. We find: (i) AdversarialCoT achieves substantial attack effectiveness across all target models and datasets, demonstrating its broad applicability and robustness against advanced reasoning LLMs. (ii) Iterative optimization plays a crucial role in enhancing attack performance, significantly improving effectiveness of adversarial CoTs. (iii) Different models and datasets exhibit varying levels of vulnerability, with Qwen3 being most susceptible to AdversarialCoT attacks while GLM4.5 shows stronger resistance, and HotpotQA generally presenting higher ASR compared to other datasets.

Comparative experiments. Table 3 shows the attack effectiveness of various methods on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct and Qwen-7B-R1-distilled. We find: (i) Previous knowledge base poisoning attacks work well on standard LLM but perform limited on reasoning versions, with the ASR of the prompt hijacking method dropping by half; (ii) Our non-iterative variant performs moderately on standard LLMs but achieves better results on reasoning LLMs, although it contains some query-irrelevant connective words to construct the reasoning-structured content; (iii) The iterative variant significantly improves performance on both LLMs, demonstrating its power in exploiting the vulnerabilities. We apply iterative optimization only to AdversarialCoT because its update signal is defined over reasoning-structured adversarial documents; extending comparable iterative refinements to other baselines is an important direction for future work.

Table 2: Attack effectiveness of AdversarialCoT on advanced reasoning LLMs across different datasets. Best results are in bold.

Model	Setup	MSMARCO			NQ			HotpotQA		
		ASR_r	ASR_g	ASR	ASR_r	ASR_g	ASR	ASR_r	ASR_g	ASR
R1	Non-iter	73	47.9	35	91	30.8	28	85	45.9	39
	Iterative	**90**	**74.4**	**67**	**99**	**66.7**	**66**	**94**	**79.8**	**75**
Qwen3	Non-iter	76	52.6	40	88	38.6	34	86	54.7	47
	Iterative	**91**	**78.0**	**71**	**95**	**77.9**	**74**	**97**	**82.5**	**80**
GLM4.5	Non-iter	75	38.7	29	90	23.3	21	85	45.9	39
	Iterative	**92**	**56.5**	**59**	**97**	**53.6**	**52**	**96**	**74.0**	**71**

Table 3: Attack results showing ASRr (%), ASRg (%) and ASR (%) across different methods and models. Best results are in bold.

	Method	Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct			Qwen-7B-R1-distilled		
		ASRr	ASRg	ASR	ASRr	ASRg	ASR
Baselines	NA	**99**	32.2	32	**99**	24.2	24
	NPA	**99**	34.3	34	**99**	25.3	25
	PHA	95	68.4	65	95	33.7	32
	PRAG	**99**	58.6	58	**99**	51.5	51
Ours	Non-iter	74	71.6	53	74	75.7	56
	Iterative	91	**79.1**	**72**	91	**81.3**	**74**

Iteration rounds scaling. To investigate how attack success rate evolves as the attacker agent interacts with the target LLM, we conduct a scaling analysis across iteration rounds 0 to 3. Figure 3 shows that: (i) All models and datasets show consistent effectiveness improvements with iterative optimization; (ii) The scaling trend follows a logarithmic pattern with diminishing marginal returns, yet still achieves substantial final attack success rates. We also record the cost trend across iteration rounds. As the number of rounds increases, we find that attack cost grows rapidly due to repeated black-box interactions and the accumulation of longer contexts. Nevertheless, the corresponding gains in ASR are substantial, indicating that iterative refinement remains worthwhile in targeted attacks. Moreover, since AdversarialCoT is query-specific and focuses on high-value targets, the per-query attack cost is still manageable in practice.

Cross-model generalization analysis. To assess the generalizability of AdversarialCoT, we inject adversarial documents generated through attacker agent interactions with one LLM into other LLMs. Figure 4 presents the change in ASR (%) when adversarial



Figure 3: ASR scaling across iteration rounds for different models and datasets.

documents generated by attacker agent interactions with source models are injected into target models. We find: (i) *Uniqueness*: In most cases, adversarial documents show decreased ASR when injected into other LLMs, indicating that each target LLM has its relatively unique vulnerabilities for target queries. (ii) *Universality*: Despite the performance decline, the attacks still maintain a certain level of effectiveness, indicating that this paradigm of reasoning perturbation inherently possesses significant misleading capability.



Figure 4: Cross-model generalization heatmap showing the change in ASR (%) when adversarial documents generated by attacker agent interactions with source models (y-axis) are injected into target models (x-axis).

From attack traces to defense. Beyond maximizing attack success, the attack traces themselves are what matter most. By tracking how the adversarial CoT adapts from rejection to acceptance, we can pinpoint specific vulnerabilities in the target LLM. The evolution of adversarial documents can help the administrators in timely understanding model defects, enhancing robustness and security. We provide a detailed case study at https://github.com/ruyisy/AdversarialCoT_case.

6 Related Work

CoT reasoning in LLMs. CoT reasoning has emerged as a crucial capability that enables LLMs to tackle complex reasoning tasks by explicitly generating intermediate reasoning steps [30]. Large language models can acquire deep thinking capabilities through reinforcement learning [27], allowing them to engage in multi-step reasoning in the form of CoT [7, 24, 39].

Retrieval-augmented generation. RAG has emerged as a powerful paradigm that combines LLMs with external knowledge. Recent research has mainly focused on improving its effectiveness [4, 10–12, 15, 32, 37]. However, these studies often overlook the security of retrieval-augmented systems. Given the growing real-world deployment of RAG, e.g., in commercial LLM services that integrate web search tools, this security issue has become particularly important [38, 40].

Adversarial attacks against RAG systems. Research on RAG has significantly improved its effectiveness [4, 11, 15, 32, 37], but security remains critically overlooked. Given the growing real-world deployment of RAG, security becomes particularly important. The retrievers and LLMs used in RAG systems have been found vulnerable to adversarial attacks [16–21, 29, 31]. Due to the complex interactions between retrieval and generation components, adversarial attack methods cannot be directly applied to RAG systems. Recently, some studies have started to focus on the security of RAG systems, revealing their susceptibility to various manipulations [9, 26, 40]. The knowledge-base poisoning attack is a typical threat method, where adversaries inject documents containing incorrect knowledge [40] or malicious prompts [38]. Prior methods either contain obvious malicious content that can easily be filtered, or simply inject incorrect knowledge without a complete evidence chain, making it difficult to reference. Furthermore, these methods mainly rely on batch injection of noisy documents, forcing LLMs to reference large amounts of toxic content [38, 40]. This approach does not reflect realistic document distributions and cannot precisely identify vulnerabilities.

7 Conclusion

In this work, we discovered that while CoT reasoning enhances performance, it inadvertently exposes an LLM's reasoning style and key evidence. Exploiting this, we proposed AdversarialCoT, a framework where an attacker agent interacts with the target LLM to adaptively imitate its reasoning process and identify cognitive vulnerabilities, driving the iterative evolution of deceptive CoTs. Experimental results demonstrate that this method poses significant threats to advanced reasoning LLMs, thereby highlighting the urgency for future security research.

Future work. We plan to extend this line of research in three directions: (i) We will further disentangle retrieval-stage exposure from reasoning-stage manipulation to better understand where the attack gains come from. (ii) We will explore adversarial CoTs targeting multi-round retrieval and dynamic planning inherent in agentic RAG systems [12]. (iii) We will explore robust reasoning mechanisms to immunize LLMs against external adversarial CoTs for safe practical deployments.

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