**A modal analysis of presupposition and modal subordination**(Journal of Semantics, 2005, 281-306. pdf file )

In this paper I give a modal two-dimensional analysis of presupposition and modal subordination. I will think of presupposition as a non-veridical propositional attitude. This allows me to evaluate what is presupposed and what is asserted at different dimensions without getting into the binding problem. What is presupposed will be represented by an accessibility relation between possible worlds. The major part of the paper consists of a proposal to account for the dependence of the interpretation of modal expressions, i.e. modal subordination, in terms of an accessibility relation as well. Moreover, I show how such an analysis can be extended from the propositional to the predicate logical level.**Presupposition: An (un)common attitude?**; (In Bauerle et al. (eds.), Presupposition and Discourse, Elsevier, Amsterdam) pdf file

In this paper I argue that presupposition should be thought of as a propositional attitude. I will separate questions on truth from questions of presupposition satisfaction by making use of a two-dimensional analysis. The update of what is presupposed will be accounted for by eliminating arrows, which also makes possible an appealing analysis of modal subordination. (The paper `A modal analysis of modal subordination' is an extension of this paper)**Asserting to Resolve Decision problems**; (Journal of Pragmatics, 2003, 35, 1161-1179, although the paper dates back to 2000)

In this paper I use our notion of relevance to resolve the potentially underspecified meaning of attitude attributions. Assuming that belief attributions are made to explain unexpected actions, and that assertions have to be relevant, it is shown that potentially ambiguous, or underspecified, {\it de re} belief attributions can be disambiguated by taking the assertion to be informative with respect to the decision problem under discussion.**Permission to Change**(Journal of Semantics, 2000, 17, pp. 119-145) pdf file

In this paper I discuss how to account for the performative effects of imperatives, and concentrate mainly on permission sentences. In the first part of the paper I argue that the performative effects of permission sentences should be accounted for in terms of a context change theory by making use of {\it contraction} defined in terms of an ordering relation, and show also how this ordering relation evolves from permission to permission. In the second part a problem for this analysis is discussed, i.e. the problem of conjunctive permission sentences. I develop two ways to solve this problem. First, I suggest that this problem is due to the wrong way of accounting for contraction, and propose an alternative way in which contraction can be defined that accounts for the performative effects of conjunctive permissions in a more satisfactory way. Although the analysis is appealing, I will argue that we should account for the problem by means of a type-shift analysis.**Some analyses of pro-attitudes.**In: H. de Swart (ed.) Logic, Game Theory, and Social Choice, Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, 1999; pdf file dvi file

E-mail: | R.A.M.VanRooijATuva.nl |
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