

# Judgment Aggregation under Issue Dependencies

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## Example: Choosing a Common Meal for a Party

A group of 23 gastro-entertainment professionals need to decide on the meal (1 dish + 1 drink) to be served at a party. What to choose?

|                 | <i>Chips?</i> | <i>Beer?</i> | <i>Caviar?</i> | <i>Champagne?</i> |
|-----------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|-------------------|
| 11 individuals: | Yes           | Yes          | No             | No                |
| 10 individuals: | No            | No           | Yes            | Yes               |
| 2 individuals:  | No            | Yes          | Yes            | No                |

Integrity Constraint:  $(Chips \text{ XOR } Caviar) \wedge (Beer \text{ XOR } Champagne)$

## Talk Outline

- Binomial Rules: Issue Dependencies in Judgment Aggregation
- Theoretical Analysis: Axiomatics and Computational Complexity
- Experimental Analysis: Aggregating Hotel Reviews

## Binomial Rules for Judgment Aggregation

Each *agent* accepts/rejects each *issue* (only some ballots are *rational*).  
An *aggregation rule* needs to map each *profile* to a consensus.

Idea: Award 1 point to potential outcome  $B^*$  for every ballot  $B_i$  and issue set  $I$  with  $|I| \in K$  such that  $B_i$  and  $B^*$  fully agree on  $I$ .

$$F_K : \mathbf{B} \mapsto \operatorname{argmax}_{B^* \text{ rational}} \sum_{B \in \mathbf{B}} \sum_{k \in K} \binom{\operatorname{Agr}(B, B^*)}{k}$$

Most general definition also includes a *weight function*  $w : K \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ .

Interesting special cases:  $K = \{k\}$  (in which case  $w$  is irrelevant).

Note: this is *Kemeny rule* for  $k = 1$  and *plurality-voter rule* for  $k = m$ .

## Theoretical Results

Nice axiomatic properties (but full characterisation is open):

**Theorem 1** *Binomial rules are amongst the very few rules discussed in the literature that satisfy both **collective rationality** and **reinforcement**:*

$$F(\mathbf{B}) \cap F(\mathbf{B}') \neq \emptyset \text{ implies } F(\mathbf{B} \oplus \mathbf{B}') = F(\mathbf{B}) \cap F(\mathbf{B}')$$

Binomial rules cover the range from the trivial to the highly intractable:

**Theorem 2** ***Winner determination** for  $F_{\{k\}}$  is in  $\mathbf{P}$  if  $(m - k) \in O(1)$ .*

**Theorem 3** *But the same problem is  $\mathbf{P}^{\mathbf{NP}}$  **[log]-complete** if  $k \in O(1)$ .*

## Experiment: Aggregating Hotel Reviews

Ratings for 6 features (*location*, etc.) of 1850 hotels from TripAdvisor.

Translation of 1–5 star scale: *accept* (4–5) or *reject* (1–3).

Results for the full data set not that interesting (see paper). But ...

## Polarisation in Judgment Aggregation

In the paper, we develop a formal measure of *polarisation* of a profile, defined as the product of a *correlation* and an *uncertainty coefficient*:

- correlation = average strength of dependencies between issue pairs
- uncertainty = average disagreement on individual issues

A subset of *31 profiles* (opinions on 31 hotels) are “*highly polarised*”.

## The Compliant Reviewer Problem

What makes for a good meta review (the result of the aggregation)?


*You are writing a hotel review for an online magazine and you want to please as many of your readers as possible (to maximise the number of like's received). Suppose a reader will like your review if she agrees with you on  $\geq k$  issues.*

We will use this *compliant-reviewer score* to evaluate our results.



## Results for Highly Polarised Profiles

Comparing two instances of our family of rules with the majority rule.



## Last Slide

Proposal for a *new family of judgment aggregation rules*:

- Attempt to account for hidden dependencies between issues
- Score agreement of outcome with ballots on subsets of issues
- Parameters: subset sizes to consider + weight function

Initial results for these so-called *binomial rules*:

- Includes *spectrum of rules* from Kemeny to plurality-voter rule
- Complexity: *winner determination* ranges from P to  $P^{NP}[\log]$
- Axiomatics: both *collective rationality* and *reinforcement* ok
- Experiments: *good performance* for highly polarised hotel reviews

New concepts of potentially independent interest:

- Notion of *polarisation* of a profile in judgment aggregation
- *Compliant Reviewer Problem* to evaluate aggregation rules