Weighted Propositional Formulas for Cardinal Preference Modelling

Ulle Endriss Institute for Logic, Language and Computation University of Amsterdam

joint work with Jérôme Lang (IRIT, Toulouse) and Yann Chevaleyre (LAMSADE, Paris-Dauphine)

(My) Background

I'm interested in Multiagent Resource Allocation (MARA) scenarios:

• A finite number of agents negotiate over a finite number of indivisible resources. Allocations evolve as agents agree on a sequence of deals. Agents act locally and are driven by their own interests. As system designers, we are interested in the quality of allocations from a social point of view.

There are a number of interesting questions that arise in this context:

- What are appropriate measures of *social welfare*? Under what circumstances can we guarantee *convergence* to a social optimum?
- What is the *computational complexity* of negotiation? How about *communication complexity*?
- What are appropriate languages for representing the *preferences* of agents over alternative bundles of resources?

This Talk

What are appropriate languages for representing *preferences* in *combinatorial* domains? Can *logic* help?

Talk Overview

- Problem: Utility Functions in Combinatorial Domains
- Languages for Representing Utility Functions:
 - "Classical" Utility Functions
 - Weighted Propositional Formulas
- Expressive Power and Correspondence Results
- Comparative Succinctness
- Complexity Issues
- Conclusion and Future Work

Utility Functions in Combinatorial Domains

Let X be a finite set. A *utility function* over the domain X is a mapping from X to the reals:

 $u:X\to \mathbb{R}$

Simply listing the utilities for every element of X is only feasible if X is reasonably small.

This is *not* the case if X has a combinatorial structure, as in resource allocation, multi-criteria decision making, elections of committees, ...

- Resource allocation: set \mathcal{R} of resources \Rightarrow set $2^{\mathcal{R}}$ of bundles
- General: set PS of propositional symbols \Rightarrow set 2^{PS} of models

Fortunately, actual utility functions often exhibit some sort of *structure*, and a suitable preference representation language might be able to capture that structure in a *concise* manner.

Classes of Utility Functions

A utility function is a mapping $u: 2^{PS} \to \mathbb{R}$.

- u is normalised iff $u(\{\}) = 0$.
- u is non-negative iff $u(X) \ge 0$.
- u is monotonic iff $u(X) \leq u(Y)$ whenever $X \subseteq Y$.
- u is modular iff $u(X \cup Y) = u(X) + u(Y) u(X \cap Y)$.
- u is concave iff $u(X \cup Y) u(Y) \le u(X \cup Z) u(Z)$ for $Y \supseteq Z$.
- Let $PS(k) = \{S \subseteq PS \mid \#S \leq k\}$. u is k-additive iff there exists another mapping $u' : PS(k) \to \mathbb{R}$ such that (for all X):

$$u(X) = \sum \{ u'(Y) \mid Y \subseteq X \text{ and } Y \in PS(k) \}$$

Also of interest: subadditive, superadditive, convex, ...

Why *k*-additive Functions?

The idea comes from fuzzy measure theory (Grabisch and others). Now also used in negotiation and combinatorial auctions.

Again, u is k-additive iff there exists a $u' : PS(k) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that:

$$u(X) = \sum \{ u'(Y) \mid Y \subseteq X \text{ and } Y \in PS(k) \}$$

In the context of resource allocation, the value u'(Y) can be seen as the additional benefit incurred from owning the items in Y together, *i.e.* beyond the benefit of owning all proper subsets.

Example: u = 4.p + 7.q - 2.p.q + 2.q.r is a 2-additive function

The k-additive form allows for a parametrisation of synergetic effects:

- 1-additive = modular (no synergies)
- |PS|-additive = general (any kind of synergies)
- ... and everything in between

Weighted Propositional Formulas

An alternative approach to preference representation is based on weighted propositional formulas

A goal base is a set $G = \{(\varphi_i, \alpha_i)\}_i$ of pairs, each consisting of a consistent propositional formula $\varphi_i \in \mathcal{L}_{PS}$ and a real number α_i . The utility function u_G generated by G is defined by

$$u_G(M) = \sum \{ \alpha_i \mid (\varphi_i, \alpha_i) \in G \text{ and } M \models \varphi_i \}$$

for all $M \in 2^{PS}$. G is called the *generator* of u_G .

We shall be interested in the following question:

• Are there simple restrictions on goal bases such that the utility functions they generate enjoy simple structural properties?

Restrictions

Let $H \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{PS}$ be a restriction on the set of propositional formulas and let $H' \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ be a restriction on the set of weights allowed.

Regarding *formulas*, we consider the following restrictions:

- A *positive* formula is a formula with no occurrence of ¬; a *strictly positive* formula is a positive formula that is not a tautology.
- A *clause* is a (possibly empty) disjunction of literals; a *k*-*clause* is a clause of length ≤ k.
- A *cube* is a (possibly empty) conjunction of literals; a *k*-*cube* is a cube of length ≤ *k*.
- A k-formula is a formula φ with at most k propositional symbols.

Regarding *weights*, we consider only the restriction to *positive* reals.

Given two restrictions H and H', let $\mathcal{U}(H, H')$ be the class of utility functions that can be generated from goal bases conforming to the restrictions H and H'.

Basic Results

Proposition 1 $\mathcal{U}(positive k-cubes, all)$ is equal to the class of k-additive utility functions.

<u>Proof:</u> Goals $(p_1 \land \cdots \land p_k, \alpha)$ directly correspond to the auxiliary utility function $u' : \{p_1, \ldots, p_k\} \mapsto \alpha \ldots \square$

Proposition 2 The following are also all equal to the class of k-additive utility functions: U(k-cubes, all), U(k-clauses, all), U(positive k-formulas, all) and U(k-formulas, all).

<u>Proof:</u> Use equivalence-preserving transformations of goal bases such as $G \cup \{(\varphi \land \neg \psi, \alpha)\} \equiv G \cup \{(\varphi, \alpha), (\varphi \land \psi, -\alpha)\}.$

Proposition 3 U(positive k-clauses, all) is equal to the class of normalised k-additive utility functions.

<u>Proof:</u> (\top, α) cannot be rewritten as a positive clause ... \Box

Monotonic Utility

Proposition 4 U(strictly positive, positive) is equal to the class of normalised monotonic utility functions.

<u>Proof:</u> A bit complicated. The easy part is to show that any function generated by positive formulas with positive weights is monotonic and that strictly positive formulas generate normalised functions.

For the converse, we need to show that we can construct a goal base belonging to $\mathcal{U}(strictly \ positive, positive)$ for any given normalised monotonic utility function ... \Box

Example: Take the normalised monotonic function u with $u(\{p_1\}) = 2$, $u(\{p_2\}) = 5$ and $u(\{p_1, p_2\}) = 6$. We obtain the following goal base:

$$G = \{ (p_1 \lor p_2, 2), (p_2, 3), (p_1 \land p_2, 1) \}$$

Overview of Correspondence Results

Formulas	Weights		Utility Functions
cubes/clauses/all	general	=	all
positive cubes/formulas	general	=	all
positive clauses	general	=	normalised
strictly positive formulas	general	=	normalised
k-cubes/clauses/formulas	general	=	k-additive
positive k -cubes/formulas	general	=	k-additive
positive k -clauses	general	=	normalised k-additive
literals	general	=	modular
atoms	general	=	normalised modular
cubes/formulas	positive	=	non-negative
clauses	positive	\subset	non-negative
strictly positive formulas	positive	=	normalised monotonic
positive clauses	positive	\subseteq	normalised concave monotonic

Comparative Succinctness

If two languages can express the same class of utility functions, which should we use? An important criterion is *succinctness*.

Let L and L' be two sets of goal bases. We say that L' is at least as succinct as L, denoted by $L \leq L'$, iff there exist a mapping $f: L \to L'$ and a *polynomial* function p such that:

- $G \equiv f(G)$ for all $G \in L$ (they generate the same functions); and
- $size(f(G)) \leq p(size(G))$ for all $G \in L$ (polysize reduction).

Write $L \prec L'$ (strictly less succinct) iff $L \preceq L'$ but not $L' \preceq L$.

Two languages can also be *incomparable* with respect to succinctness.

An Incomparability Result

Let n-cubes $\subseteq \mathcal{L}_{PS}$ be the restriction to cubes of length n = |PS|, containing either p or $\neg p$ for every $p \in PS$.

<u>Fact</u>: $\mathcal{U}(n\text{-}cubes, all)$ is equal to the class of all utility functions (and corresponds to the standard "bundle form" of writing utility functions).

Proposition 5 $\mathcal{U}(n\text{-}cubes, all)$ and $\mathcal{U}(positive \ cubes, all)$ are incomparable (in view of their succinctness).

<u>Proof:</u> The following two functions can be used to prove the mutual lack of a polysize reduction:

- $u_1(M) = |M|$ can be generated by a goal base of just n positive cubes of length 1, but we require $2^n 1$ n-cubes to generate u_1 .
- The function u₂, with u₂(M) = 1 for |M| = 1 and u₂(M) = 0 otherwise, can be generated by a goal base of n n-cubes, but we require 2ⁿ−1 positive cubes to generate u₂.

The Efficiency of Negation

Recall that both $\mathcal{U}(positive \ cubes, \ all)$ and $\mathcal{U}(cubes, \ all)$ are equal to the class of all utility functions. So which should we use?

Proposition 6 $\mathcal{U}(positive \ cubes, all) \prec \mathcal{U}(cubes, all)$. ["less succinct"]

<u>Proof:</u> Clearly, $\mathcal{U}(positive \ cubes, all) \preceq \mathcal{U}(cubes, all)$, because any positive cube is also a cube.

Now consider u with $u(\{\}) = 1$ and u(M) = 0 for all $M \neq \{\}$:

- $G = \{(\neg p_1 \land \cdots \land \neg p_n, 1)\} \in \mathcal{U}(cubes, all)$ has *linear* size and generates u.
- $G' = \{(\bigwedge X, (-1)^{|X|}) \mid X \subseteq PS\} \in \mathcal{U}(\text{positive cubes, all})$ has exponential size and also generates u.

On the other hand, the generator of u must be *unique* if only positive cubes are allowed (start with $(\top, 1) \in G_u \dots$).

Complexity

Other interesting questions concern the complexity of reasoning about preferences. Consider the following decision problem:

MAX-UTILITY(H, H')

Given:	Goal base $G \in \mathcal{U}(H, H')$ and $K \in \mathbb{Z}$
Question:	Is there an $M \in 2^{PS}$ such that $u_G(M) \ge K$?

Some basic results are straightforward:

- MAX-UTILITY(H, H') is in NP for any choice of H and H', because we can always check $u_G(M) \ge K$ in polynomial time.
- MAX-UTILITY(*all*, *all*) is *NP-complete* (reduction from SAT).

More interesting questions would be whether there are either (1) "large" sublanguages for which MAX-UTILITY is still polynomial, or (2) "small" sublanguages for which it is already NP-hard.

Three Complexity Results

Proposition 7 MAX-UTILITY(k-clauses, positive) is NP-complete, even for k = 2.

<u>Proof</u>: Reduction from MAX2SAT (NP-complete): "Given a set of 2-clauses, is there a satisfiable subset with cardinality $\geq K$?". \Box

Proposition 8 MAX-UTILITY(*literals*, *all*) is in P.

<u>Proof:</u> Assuming that G contains every literal exactly once (possibly with weight 0), making p true iff the weight of p is greater than the weight of $\neg p$ results in a model with maximal utility. \Box

Proposition 9 MAX-UTILITY(*positive*, *positive*) is in P.

<u>Proof:</u> Making *all* propositional symbols true yields maximal utility.

Conclusion and Future Work

- Comparison of two ways of modelling utility functions, used in different communities (*expressive power/correspondence results*).
- If two languages are equally expressive, we need to use other criteria do decide which to use (simplicity versus *succinctness*).
- This is ongoing work; we want to collect more results of this type to get a clearer picture of the general situation.
- The *complexity results* are still preliminary, but may lead somewhere interesting.
- Investigate other *aggregation functions* (than sum-taking) for weighted propositional formulas (such as *max*).
- Investigate connections to *bidding languages* for combinatorial auctions (e.g. XOR-language = *max* of positive cubes).