

Tutorial #2

Exercise 1

For each of the two games shown below, determine whether it is a potential game.

(a)	(b)																		
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Exercise 2

We saw a number of different solution concepts for normal-form games in class and discussed how they relate to each other. In particular, we established the following ‘inclusions’:

$$\text{Equilibria in Strictly Dominant Strategies} \subseteq \text{Pure NE} \subseteq \text{NE} \subseteq \text{Correlated Equilibria}$$

What does the symbol ‘ \subseteq ’ represent here? Does it represent the same kind of relationship in all three cases? Once you have clarified this matter, for each of the three ‘inclusions’, provide a simple and intuitive argument for why the claim being made here is indeed correct.

Exercise 3

To show that the solution concept for normal-form games provided by the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is well-defined, we had to prove that it does not matter in which order you eliminate strategies (in those cases where there is more than one strategy that could be eliminated): we always arrive at the same irreducible game. To help you understand this result, review the following details of the proof presented in class:

- (a) If you are unsure what it means for a binary relation to have the Church-Rosser property, look it up. Then write down a definition for the relation \rightarrow being Church-Rosser using the usual first-order notation (and variable names G, G' , etc.). For example, asymmetry of \rightarrow can be defined like this: $\forall G. \forall G'. (G \rightarrow G') \rightarrow \neg(G' \rightarrow G)$.
- (b) One of the steps in the proof is established by reference to a diagram. Which step is this? How does the diagram illustrate the correctness of that step?
- (c) What does the ad-hoc notation $G \xrightarrow{a_i} G'$, used on the slides, represent?
- (d) On the slides, there is the claim that, in order to show that the relation \rightarrow is Church-Rosser, it is sufficient to show that the following is the case:

$$\text{if } G \xrightarrow{a_i} G' \text{ and } G \xrightarrow{b_j} G'', \text{ then } G' \xrightarrow{b_j} G''' \text{ for some } G'''$$

At first sight, this might not be obvious. Why do we not also have to show that G''' can be reached from G'' as well (and not just from G')?

- (e) The proof on the slides only covers the case where the player playing the first action is different from the player playing the second action (i.e., the case where $i \neq j$). Indeed, for $i = j$ it would not make sense to speak of partial profiles \mathbf{s}'_{-j} with $a_i \notin \text{support}(s'_i)$. So, strictly speaking, we still need to prove that the following is the case:

if $G \xrightarrow{a_i} G'$ and $G \xrightarrow{b_i} G''$, then $G' \xrightarrow{b_i} G'''$ for some G'''

Explain why this is (almost trivially) true.