Automated Reasoning for Social Choice Theory

Ulle Endriss
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
University of Amsterdam

Outline

A powerful approach in *computational social choice* is to use automated reasoning tools (notably *SAT solvers*) to obtain (*axiomatic*) results.

But to date there are only very few papers in this area, because it's hard to get started with this kind of research. **Plan:** to help you get started yourself.

- **Session 1 (now)**
  - introduction to the axiomatic method in social choice theory
  - (manual) proof of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

- **Session 2 (this afternoon)**
  - automated reasoning approaches to social choice theory
  - in-depth discussion of proof of G-S Theorem using a SAT solver

- **Session 3 (next Tuesday afternoon)**
  - (optional) presentations of recent literature by participants
  - (optional) discussion of solutions to programming exercises
  - (optional) discussion of possible directions for future research
Session 1: The Axiomatic Method
Plan for Session 1

After a brief introduction to the theory of voting, we will review the axiomatic method to analyse what makes for a good voting rule.

Our focus will be on the analysis of strategic behaviour of voters.

We will discuss the following seminal results in social choice theory:

- *Arrow’s Theorem* (1951)

Much of this material is covered in my expository paper cited below.

Later we’ll see an alternative proof of the G-S Thm via SAT solving.

Three Voting Rules

Suppose \( n \) voters choose from a set of \( m \) alternatives by stating their preferences in the form of linear orders over the alternatives.

Here are three voting rules (there are many more):

- **Plurality**: elect the alternative ranked first most often (i.e., each voter assigns 1 point to an alternative of her choice, and the alternative receiving the most points wins)

- **Plurality with runoff**: run a plurality election and retain the two front-runners; then run a majority contest between them

- **Borda**: each voter gives \( m-1 \) points to the alternative she ranks first, \( m-2 \) to the alternative she ranks second, etc.; and the alternative with the most points wins
Example: Choosing a Beverage for Lunch

Consider this election, with nine voters having to choose from three alternatives (namely what beverage to order for a common lunch):

- 2 Germans: Beer $\succ$ Wine $\succ$ Milk
- 3 Frenchmen: Wine $\succ$ Beer $\succ$ Milk
- 4 Dutchmen: Milk $\succ$ Beer $\succ$ Wine

Which beverage wins the election for

- the plurality rule?
- plurality with runoff?
- the Borda rule?
The Model

Fix a finite set $A = \{a, b, c, \ldots\}$ of *alternatives*, with $|A| = m$.

Let $L(A)$ denote the set of all strict linear orders $\succ$ on $A$. We use elements of $L(A)$ to model (true) *preferences* and (declared) *ballots*.

Each member $i$ of a finite set $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ of *voters* supplies us with a ballot $\succ_i$, giving rise to a *profile* $\succ = (\succ_1, \ldots, \succ_n) \in L(A)^n$ (sometimes denoted $R = (R_1, \ldots, R_n) \in L(A)^n$).

**Notation:** Write $N_{x \succ y}^R = \{i \in N \mid (x, y) \in R_i\}$ for the set of voters who rank alternative $x$ above alternative $y$ in profile $R$.

A (resolute) *voting rule* (or *social choice function*) for $N$ and $A$ selects one winner for every such profile:

$$F : L(A)^n \rightarrow A$$

**Remark:** Most natural voting rules are *irresolute* and have to be paired with a *tie-breaking rule* to always select a unique election winner.
The Axiomatic Method

Discussion: How do you choose the right voting rule?

One popular approach is to resort to the axiomatic method:

formulate basic normative principles (“axioms”) a voting rule should satisfy and then see what those axioms entail . . .
Axiom: The Pareto Principle

A resolute voting rule $F$ is called (weakly) Paretian if, whenever all voters rank alternative $x$ above alternative $y$, then $y$ cannot win:

$$N^R_{x>y} = N \implies F(R) \neq y$$

Discussion: Is this indeed a desirable property of a voting rule?
Axiom: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

If alternative \( x \) wins and \( y \) does not, then \( x \) is \textit{socially preferred} to \( y \).

If both \( x \) and \( y \) lose, then we cannot say.

Whether \( x \) is socially preferred to \( y \) should \textit{depend} only on the relative rankings of \( x \) and \( y \) in the profile (not on other, irrelevant, alternatives).

These considerations motivate our next axiom:

\( F \) is called \textit{independent} if, for any two profiles \( R, R' \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n \)
and any two distinct alternatives \( x, y \in A \), it is the case that
\( N_{x \succ y}^R = N_{x \succ y}^{R'} \) and \( F(R) = x \) imply \( F(R') \neq y \).

Thus, if \( x \) prevents \( y \) from winning in \( R \) and the relative rankings of \( x \) and \( y \) remain the same, then \( x \) also prevents \( y \) from winning in \( R' \).

Discussion: \textit{Is this indeed a desirable property of a voting rule?}
**Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem**

The seminal result in SCT, here adapted from *social welfare functions* to *social choice functions* (i.e., to resolute voting rules):

**Theorem 1 (Arrow, 1951)** Any resolute SCF for $\geq 3$ alternatives that is Paretian and independent must be a dictatorship.

**Terminology:** $F$ is a *dictatorship* if there exists an $i \in N$ such that $F(R) = \text{top}(R_i)$ for every profile $R$. Voter $i$ is the dictator.

**Remarks:**
- You should be surprised by this and refuse to believe it (for now).
- Not true for $m = 2$ alternatives. *(Why?)*
- Common misunderstanding: dictatorship $\neq$ “local dictatorship”
- Impossibility reading: independence $+$ Pareto $+$ nondictatoriality
- Characterisation reading: dictatorship $=$ independence $+$ Pareto

---

Proof Plan

For full details consult my expository paper cited below.

Let $F$ be a SCF for $\geq 3$ alternatives that is Paretian and independent.

Call a coalition $C \subseteq N$ decisive for $(x, y)$ if $C \subseteq N_{x \succeq y} \Rightarrow y \neq F(R)$.

We proceed as follows:

- **Pareto** condition $N$ is decisive for all pairs of alternatives
- $C$ with $|C| \geq 2$ decisive for all pairs $\Rightarrow$ some $C' \subset C$ as well
- By induction: there’s a decisive coalition of size 1 (= dictator).

Remark: Observe that this only works for finite sets of voters. (Why?)

The step in the middle of the list is known as the **Contraction Lemma**.

To prove it, we first require another lemma . . .

---

Contagion Lemma

Recall: $C \subseteq N$ decisive for $(x, y)$ if $C \subseteq N^R_{x \succ y} \Rightarrow y \neq F(R)$

Call $C \subseteq N$ weakly decisive for $(x, y)$ if $C = N^R_{x \succ y} \Rightarrow y \neq F(R)$.

Claim: $C$ weakly decisive for $(x, y) \Rightarrow C$ decisive for all pairs $(x', y')$.

Proof: Suppose $x, y, x', y'$ are all distinct (other cases: similar).

Consider a profile where individuals express these preferences:

- Members of $C$: $x' \succ x \succ y \succ y'$
- Others: $x' \succ x$, $y \succ y'$, and $y \succ x$ (note: $x'$-vs.-$y'$ not specified)
- All rank $x, y, x', y'$ above all other alternatives.

From $C$ being weakly decisive for $(x, y)$: $y$ must lose.

From Pareto: $x$ must lose (to $x'$) and $y'$ must lose (to $y$).

Thus, $x'$ must win (and $y'$ must lose). By independence, $y'$ will still lose when everyone changes their non-$x'$-vs.-$y'$ rankings.

Thus, for every profile $R$ with $C \subseteq N^R_{x' \succ y'}$ we get $y' \neq F(R)$. √
**Contraction Lemma**

**Claim:** If $C \subseteq N$ with $|C| \geq 2$ is a coalition that is decisive on all pairs of alternatives, then so is some nonempty coalition $C' \subset C$.

**Proof:** Take any nonempty $C_1, C_2$ with $C = C_1 \cup C_2$ and $C_1 \cap C_2 = \emptyset$.

Recall that there are $\geq 3$ alternatives. Consider this profile:

- Members of $C_1$: $x \succ y \succ z \succ \text{rest}$
- Members of $C_2$: $y \succ z \succ x \succ \text{rest}$
- Others: $z \succ x \succ y \succ \text{rest}$

As $C = C_1 \cup C_2$ is decisive, $z$ cannot win (it loses to $y$). Two cases:

1. The winner is $x$: Exactly $C_1$ ranks $x \succ z \Rightarrow$ By independence, in any profile where exactly $C_1$ ranks $x \succ z$, $z$ will lose (to $x$) $\Rightarrow C_1$ is weakly decisive on $(x, z)$. So by Contagion Lemma: $C_1$ is decisive on all pairs.

2. The winner is $y$, i.e., $x$ loses (to $y$). Exactly $C_2$ ranks $y \succ x \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow C_2$ is decisive on all pairs.

Hence, one of $C_1$ and $C_2$ will always be decisive. $\checkmark$
Example

Recall that under the *plurality rule* the candidate ranked first most often wins the election.

Assume the preferences of the people in, say, Florida are as follows:

- 49%: Bush $\succ$ Gore $\succ$ Nader
- 20%: Gore $\succ$ Nader $\succ$ Bush
- 20%: Gore $\succ$ Bush $\succ$ Nader
- 11%: Nader $\succ$ Gore $\succ$ Bush

So even if nobody is cheating, Bush will win this election.

► It would have been in the interest of the Nader supporters to *manipulate*, i.e., to misrepresent their preferences.

Is there a better voting rule that avoids this problem?
Truthfulness, Manipulation, Strategyproofness

We now distinguish the ballots a voter reports from her true preference. Both are elements of $\mathcal{L}(A)$. If they coincide, then the voter is truthful.

$F$ is strategyproof (or immune to manipulation) if for no individual $i \in N$ there exist a profile $R$ (including the “truthful preference” $R_i$ of $i$) and a linear order $R'_i$ (representing the “untruthful” ballot of $i$) such that $F(R'_i, R_{-i})$ is ranked above $F(R)$ according to $R_i$.

In other words: under a strategyproof voting rule no voter will ever have an incentive to misrepresent her preferences.

Discussion:

• Why do we want voting rules to be strategyproof? (Or why not?)
• What do you think about the “full information” assumption?

Notation: $(R'_i, R_{-i})$ is the profile obtained by replacing $R_i$ in $R$ by $R'_i$. 
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) independently proved:

**Theorem 2 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite)** Any resolute SCF for $\geq 3$ alternatives that is surjective and strategyproof is a dictatorship.

**Axiom:** $F$ is surjective if for every alternative $x \in A$ there is a profile $R$ such that $F(R) = x$. So no $x$ is excluded from winning a priori.

**Remarks:**
- a surprising result + not applicable in case of two alternatives
- The opposite direction is clear: dictatorial $\Rightarrow$ strategyproof
- Random procedures don’t count (but might be “strategyproof”).

**Exercise:** Show that surjectivity is required for this theorem to hold.


Proof Plan

We will show that the axioms featuring in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem entail the axioms featuring in Arrow’s Theorem:

- strategyproofness $\Rightarrow$ independence
- strategyproofness $+$ surjectivity $\Rightarrow$ Pareto Principle

The claim then follows from Arrow’s Theorem.

Again, for full details consult my expository paper cited below.

**Lemma: Deriving Independence**

Recall: $F$ is *independent* if, for $x \neq y$, we have that $N_{x \succ y}^R = N_{x \succ y}^{R'}$ and $F(R) = x$ together imply $F(R') \neq y$.

**Claim:** If $F$ is strategyproof, then $F$ is also independent.

**Proof:** Suppose $F$ is strategyproof.

For the sake of contradiction, assume $F$ is not independent, i.e., can find $x \neq y$ and $R \neq R'$ s.t. $N_{x \succ y}^R = N_{x \succ y}^{R'}$ and $F(R) = x$ yet $F(R') = y$.

W.l.o.g., assume that $R$ and $R'$ differ on just a single *voter* $i$ (if voters switch one by one, there must be a *first* violation of independence).

But then, if $R'$ is the truthful profile, voter $i$ has an incentive to manipulate and move to profile $R$. *Contradiction!* ✓
Lemma: Deriving the Pareto Principle

Recall: $F$ is Paretian if $N^R_{x \succ y} = N$ implies $F(R) \neq y$.

Claim: If $F$ is strategyproof and surjective, then $F$ is also Paretian.

Proof: Suppose $F$ is strategyproof and surjective.

Take any two alternatives $x$ and $y$.

From surjectivity: $x$ will win for some profile $R$.

Starting in $R$, have everyone move $x$ to the top (if not there already).
Due to strategyproofness, after every such move, $x$ still wins, as otherwise the voter who just moved $x$ to the top would have an incentive to manipulate in that new profile.

From independence: $y$ does not win for any profile where all voters continue to rank $x \succ y$. ✓
Circumventing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

So it is impossible to design reasonable voting rules that cannot be manipulated by a strategic voter.

But there are approaches to circumventing this impossibility:

• domain restrictions, such as *single-peakedness*
• *computational barriers* to manipulation
• *informational barriers* to manipulation


Irresolute Voting Rules

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem only applies to resolute rules. But every “natural” voting rule will sometimes result in a tie.

Arguably, we really should be analysing irresolute voting rules:

\[ F : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \rightarrow 2^A \setminus \{\emptyset\} \]
Manipulability w.r.t. Psychological Assumptions

To analyse manipulability when we might get a set of winners, we need to make assumptions on how voters rank \textit{sets of alternatives}, e.g.:

- A voter is an \textit{optimist} if she prefers $X$ over $Y$ whenever she prefers her favourite $x \in X$ over her favourite $y \in Y$.
- A voter is a \textit{pessimist} if she prefers $X$ over $Y$ whenever she prefers her least preferred $x \in X$ over her least preferred $y \in Y$.

Now we can speak about manipulability by certain types of voters:

- $F$ is called \textit{immune to manipulation by optimistic voters} if no optimistic voter can ever benefit from voting untruthfully.
- $F$ is called \textit{immune to manipulation by pessimistic voters} if no pessimistic voter can ever benefit from voting untruthfully.
Axiom: Nonimposition

Let $F$ be an *irresolute* voting rule/SCF $F : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \rightarrow 2^A \setminus \{\emptyset\}$.

$F$ is *nonimposed* if for every alternative $x$ there exists a profile $R$ under which $x$ is the unique winner: $F(R) = \{x\}$.

For comparison, *surjectivity* means that for every element in the range of $F$ there is an input producing that element. Thus:

\[
\text{resolute} \Rightarrow (\text{nonimposed} = \text{surjective})
\]
Dictatorships for Irresolute Rules

Let $F$ be an *irresolute* voting rule/SCF $F : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \rightarrow 2^A \setminus \{\emptyset\}$.

There are two natural notions of dictatorship for such rules:

- Voter $i \in N$ is called a (strong) *dictator* if $F(R) = \{\text{top}(R_i)\}$ for every profile $R \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n$.

- Voter $i \in N$ is called a *weak dictator* if $\text{top}(R_i) \in F(R)$ for every profile $R \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n$. (Such a voter is also called a *nominator*.)

$F$ is called *weakly dictatorial* if it has a weak dictator. Otherwise $F$ is called *strongly nondictatorial*. 
The Duggan-Schwartz Theorem

There are several extensions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for irresolute voting rules. The Duggan-Schwartz Theorem is usually regarded as the strongest of these results.

Our statement of the theorem follows Taylor (2002):

**Theorem 3 (Duggan and Schwartz, 2000)** Any voting rule for $\geq 3$ alternatives that is nonimposed and immune to manipulation by both optimistic and pessimistic voters is weakly dictatorial.

**Proof:** Omitted.

Note that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is a direct corollary.


Summary

This has been an introduction to the axiomatic method in SCT, and voting theory in particular. We focused on strategic manipulation:

- **Gibbard-Satterthwaite**: only dictatorships are strategyproof amongst the resolute and surjective voting rules

- **Duggan-Schwartz**: dropping the resoluteness requirement does not provide a clear way out of this impossibility

Recall that we first proved Arrow’s Theorem and then used it as a lemma to prove the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.

Next: Automating the proofs for results such as these . . .
Session 2: SAT Solving for Social Choice Theory
Plan for Session 2

Obtaining axiomatic results in SCT is hard: eliminating various minor errors from the original proof of Arrow’s Theorem took several years; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem was conjectured at least a decade before it was proved correct; getting new results is really challenging.

Can automated reasoning, as studied in AI, help? Yes!

We will focus on one such approach (case study: G-S Theorem):

- encode a social choice scenario into propositional logic
- reason about this encoding with the help of a SAT solver

Consult Geist and Peters (2017) for an introduction to this approach.

But first: general remarks on logic and automated reasoning for SCT

Logic for Social Choice Theory

It can be insightful to model SCT problems in logic (Pauly, 2008):

- One research direction is to explore how far we can get using a \textit{standard logic}, such as classical FOL. Do we need second-order constructs to capture IIA? (Grandi and Endriss, 2013)
- Another direction is to design \textit{tailor-made logics} specifically for SCT (for instance, a modal logic). Can we cast the proof of Arrow's Theorem in natural deduction? (Ciná and Endriss, 2016)


Automated Reasoning Approaches

Logic has long been used to help verify the correctness of hardware and software. Can we use this methodology also here? Yes!

- Automated verification of a (known) proof of Arrow’s Theorem in the HOL proof assistant Isabelle (Nipkow, 2009).
- Automated proof of Arrow’s Theorem for 3 alternatives and 2 voters using a SAT solver (Tang and Lin, 2009).
- Use of model checking to verify correctness of implementations (e.g., in Java) of voting rules (Beckert et al., 2017).

We will now focus on the second approach above.


Case Study: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

Recall this central theorem of social choice theory:

**Theorem 4 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite)** There exists no resolute SCF for ≥ 3 alternatives that is surjective, strategyproof, and nondictatorial.

Remark: The theorem is trivially true for \( n = 1 \) voter. (Why?)

We will now discuss an alternative proof:

- We use a *SAT solver* to automatically prove that the theorem holds for the *smallest nontrivial case* (with \( n = 2 \) and \( m = 3 \)).
- Using purely theoretical means, we prove that this entails the theorem for *all larger values of \( n \) and \( m \)* (as long as \( n \) is finite).

---


Approach

We will use \textit{Lingeling}, a SAT solver developed by the formal methods group at Johannes Kepler University Linz (fmv.jku.at/lingeling/).

Lingeling can check whether a given formula in CNF is satisfiable. The formula must be represented as a \textit{list of lists of integers}, corresponding to a \textit{conjunction of disjunctions of literals}. Positive (negative) numbers represent positive (negative) literals.

\textbf{Example:} \([[[1,-2,3], [-1,4]]]\) represents \((p \lor \neg q \lor r) \land (\neg p \lor s)\).

We will use a \textit{Python} script (Python3) to generate a propositional formula \(\varphi_{GS}\) that is satisfiable iff there exists a resolute SCF for \(n = 2\) voters and \(m = 3\) alternatives that is surjective, SP, and nondictatorial. Using Lingeling, we will show that \(\varphi_{GS}\) is \textit{not satisfiable}.

To access Lingeling from Python we will use the library \texttt{pylg1}, which provides a function \texttt{solve} (pypi.org/project/pylg1/).

\textbf{Example:} \texttt{solve([[1], [-1,2], [-2]])} will result in ’UNSAT’. √
Basics: Voters, Alternatives, Profiles

We first fix $n$ (number of voters) and $m$ (number of alternatives):

$n = 2$
$m = 3$

Voters and alternatives are referred to by number (starting from 0). Functions to retrieve the lists of all voters and all alternatives:

```python
def allVoters():
    return range(n)

def allAlternatives():
    return range(m)
```

There are $(m!)^n$ different profiles. We refer to them by number as well. Function to retrieve the list of all profiles:

```python
from math import factorial

def allProfiles():
    return range(factorial(m) ** n)
```
Working with Permutations

We will model *preferences as permutations* of the set of alternatives. The most complicated piece of code we need is a function to return the *nth permutation of a given list L* (with \( n \in \{0, \ldots, |L|! - 1\} \)):

```python
def nthPerm(num, mylist):
    length = len(mylist)
    if length > 1:
        pos = num // factorial(length-1)
        restnum = num - pos * factorial(length-1)
        restlist = mylist[:pos] + mylist[pos+1:]
        return [mylist[pos]] + nthPerm(restnum, restlist)
    else:
        return [mylist[0]]
```

This works as intended:

```python
>>> nthPerm(1, [0,1,2])
[0, 2, 1]
>>> nthPerm(5, [0,1,2])
[2, 1, 0]
```
Extracting Preferences

Also preferences are referred to by number (between 0 and $m! - 1$).

Function to return the preference of voter $i$ in profile $R$:

```python
def preference(i, r):
    fact = factorial(m)
    return ( r % (fact ** (i+1)) ) // (fact ** i)
```

Think of profile numbers as $m!$-ary numbers (digits = preferences).

**Example:** For $n = 5$ and $m = 3$, to extract the preference of voter 1 in profile number 99, note that $99 = 0 \cdot 6^4 + 0 \cdot 6^3 + 2 \cdot 6^2 + 4 \cdot 6^1 + 3 \cdot 6^0$.

So her preference order is the 4th permutation of $[0,1,2]$. 
Interpreting Preferences

Putting together our functions for extracting (numbers representing) preferences from a given (number representing a) profile and for handling permutations, it is now straightforward to provide a function to check whether \textit{voter }i\textit{ prefers alternative }x\textit{ to }y\textit{ in profile }R:\n
\begin{verbatim}
def prefers(i, x, y, r):
    mylist = nthPerm(preference(i,r), list(allAlternatives()))
    return mylist.index(x) < mylist.index(y)
\end{verbatim}

Function to check whether \textit{x is voter }i\textit{'s top alternative in profile }R:\n
\begin{verbatim}
def top(i, x, r):
    mylist = nthPerm(preference(i,r), list(allAlternatives()))
    return mylist.index(x) == 0
\end{verbatim}
Restricting the Range of Quantification

When formulating axioms, we sometimes need to quantify over all alternatives that satisfy a certain (boolean) condition:

```python
def alternatives(condition):
    return [x for x in allAlternatives() if condition(x)]
```

**Example:** You can now generate the list of all alternatives that meet the condition of being different from 1 (condition = $\lambda x.(x \neq 1)$).

```python
>>> alternatives(lambda x : x!=1)
[0, 2]
```

And the corresponding functions for voters and profiles:

```python
def voters(condition):
    return [i for i in allVoters() if condition(i)]

def profiles(condition):
    return [r for r in allProfiles() if condition(r)]
```
**Literals**

We can specify any (possibly irresolute) SCF $F : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \rightarrow 2^A \setminus \{\emptyset\}$ by saying whether or not $x \in F(R)$ for every profile $R$ and alternative $x$.

So create a propositional variable $p_{R,x}$ for every profile $R \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n$ and every alternative $x \in A$, with the intended meaning that:

$$p_{R,x} \text{ is true iff } x \in F(R)$$

**Exercise:** How many variables for $n = 2$ voters and $m = 3$ alternatives?

Need to decide *which number* to use to represent $p_{R,x}$. Good option:

```python
def posLiteral(r, x):
    return r * m + x + 1

Recall: r ∈ \{0, ..., (m!)^n−1\} and x ∈ \{0, ..., m−1\}
```

And negative literals are represented by negative numbers:

```python
def negLiteral(r, x):
    return (-1) * posLiteral(r, x)
```
Modelling Social Choice Functions

Every assignment of truth values to our 108 variables $p_{R,x}$ corresponds to a function $F : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \rightarrow 2^A$ (in case $n = 2$ and $|A| = 3$).

But: a (possibly irresolute) SCF is a function $F : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \rightarrow 2^A \setminus \{\emptyset\}$.

Fix this by restricting attention to models of this formula:

$$\varphi_{\text{at-least-one}} = \bigwedge_{R \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n} \left( \bigvee_{x \in A} p_{R,x} \right)$$

The following function will generate this formula:

```python
def cnfAtLeastOne():
    cnf = []
    for r in allProfiles():
        cnf.append([posLiteral(r,x) for x in allAlternatives()])
    return cnf
```
**At Least One Winning Alternative**

Let’s give it a try:

```python
>>> cnfAtLeastOne()
[[1, 2, 3], [4, 5, 6], [7, 8, 9], [10, 11, 12], [13, 14, 15],
 [16, 17, 18], [19, 20, 21], [22, 23, 24], [25, 26, 27], [28,
 29, 30], [31, 32, 33], [34, 35, 36], [37, 38, 39], [40, 41,
 42], [43, 44, 45], [46, 47, 48], [49, 50, 51], [52, 53, 54],
 [55, 56, 57], [58, 59, 60], [61, 62, 63], [64, 65, 66], [67,
 68, 69], [70, 71, 72], [73, 74, 75], [76, 77, 78], [79, 80,
 81], [82, 83, 84], [85, 86, 87], [88, 89, 90], [91, 92, 93],
 [94, 95, 96], [97, 98, 99], [100, 101, 102], [103, 104, 105],
 [106, 107, 108]]
```

**Nice:** we really get $(3!)^2 = 36$ clauses of 3 positive literals each.
Resoluteness

We now write similar functions for each one of our axioms.

$F$ is *resolute* if for all profiles $R$ and all alternatives $x$ and $y$ it is the case that $x \not\in F(R)$ or $y \not\in F(R)$. So: at most one winner per profile.

**Note:** Can restrict quantification to $x < y$ (when taken as numbers).

$$
\varphi_{\text{resolute}} = \bigwedge_{R \in L(A)^n} \left( \bigwedge_{x \in A} \left( \bigwedge_{y \in A \text{ s.t. } x < y} \neg p_{R,x} \lor \neg p_{R,y} \right) \right)
$$

def cnfResolute():
    cnf = []
    for r in allProfiles():
        for x in allAlternatives():
            for y in alternatives(lambda y : x < y):
                cnf.append([negLiteral(r,x), negLiteral(r,y)])
    return cnf
Surjectivity

Surjectivity is most naturally expressed as a conjunction of disjunctions of conjunctions (*how?*). Could translate to CNF, but this is easier:

If $F$ is already known to be *resolute*, then $F$ is *surjective* if for all alternatives $x$ there exists a profile $R$ such that $x \in F(R)$.

$$\varphi_{\text{surjective}} = \bigwedge_{x \in A} \left( \bigvee_{R \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n} p_{R,x} \right)$$

So: every alternative is amongst the winners in at least one profile.

```python
def cnfSurjective():
    cnf = []
    for x in allAlternatives():
        cnf.append([posLiteral(r,x) for r in allProfiles()])
    return cnf
```
Preparation for Modelling Strategyproofness

To model strategyproofness we need to be able to model that two profiles are so-called \textit{i}-\textit{variants} (for some agent $i \in N$):

$$R =_{-i} R' \iff R_j = R'_j \text{ for all agents } j \in N \setminus \{i\}$$

**Recall:** $\text{preference}(j,r)$ returns the preference of voter $j$ in profile $r$

Now our implementation is straightforward:

```python
def iVariants(i, r1, r2):
    return all(preference(j,r1) ==
                preference(j,r2) for j in voters(lambda j : j!=i))
```

Ulle Endriss 44
**Strategyproofness**

Resolute $F$ is *strategyproof* if for all voters $i$, all (truthful) profiles $R_1$, all of its $i$-variants $R_2$, all alternatives $x$, and all alternatives $y$ dispreferred to $x$ by $i$ in $R_1$ we have: $F(R_1) = y$ implies $F(R_2) \neq x$.

$$\varphi_{SP} = \bigwedge_{i \in N} \left( \bigwedge_{R_1 \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n} \left( \bigwedge_{R_2 \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n} \right) \right)$$

```python
def cnfStrategyProof():
    cnf = []
    for i in allVoters():
        for r1 in allProfiles():
            for r2 in profiles(lambda r2: iVariants(i, r1, r2)):
                for x in allAlternatives():
                    for y in alternatives(lambda y: prefers(i, x, y, r1)):
                        cnf.append([negLiteral(r1, y), negLiteral(r2, x)])
    return cnf
```

Ulle Endriss
Nondictatorship

Resolute $F$ is *nondictatorial* if for all voters $i$ there exists a profile $R$ such that $F(R) \neq x$ for alternative $x = \text{top}_i(R)$.

$$\varphi_{\text{nondictatorial}} = \bigwedge_{i \in N} \left( \bigvee_{R \in \mathcal{L}(A)^n} \left( \bigvee_{x \in A \text{ s.t. } x = \text{top}_i(R)} \neg p_{R,x} \right) \right)$$

this works as $x = \text{top}_i(R)$ for just one $x$

```python
def cnfNondictatorial():
    cnf = []
    for i in allVoters():
        clause = []
        for r in allProfiles():
            for x in alternatives(lambda x : top(i,x,r)):
                clause.append(negLiteral(r,x))
        cnf.append(clause)
    return cnf
```
Proving the (Special Case of the) Theorem

Putting it all together:

```python
>>> cnf = ( cnfAtLeastOne() + cnfResolute() + cnfSurjective()
...    + cnfStrategyProof() + cnfNondictatorial() )
```

This is a conjunction of 1445 clauses (using 108 variables, as we saw):

```python
>>> len(cnf)
1445
```

We make Lingeling available like this:

```python
from pylgl import solve
```

And now the moment of truth has come:

```python
>>> solve(cnf)
'UNSAT'
```

Done! So the G-S Theorem really holds for \( n = 2 \) and \( m = 3 \). Nice. \( \checkmark \)
Discussion: Confidence in Computer Proofs?

Some will object to this approach. Can we trust this kind of proof?

Your computer-generated proof using a SAT solver is valid only if:

- your encoding of your question into propositional logic is correct
- the implementation of the SAT solver is correct
- the environment the solver is running in works to specification

Fortunately, there are some pretty good counterarguments:

- Correctness of (leading) SAT solvers not an issue: was scrutinised by many more people than most manual proofs in the literature. So, if the part you implement yourself is short and clean (if it can be printed in a paper submitted for publication), then you are ok.
- Due to standardised input/output format for SAT solvers, you can verify the correctness of your proof using third-party tools.
- Sometimes you can automatically extract a human-readable proof.
Completing the Proof of the G-S Theorem

We now have a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for the special case of \( n = 2 \) voters and \( m = 3 \) alternatives. Next we show:

- impossible for \( n \geq 2 \) and \( m = 3 \) \( \Rightarrow \) impossible for \( n+1 \) and \( m = 3 \)
- impossible for \( n \geq 2 \) and \( m = 3 \) \( \Rightarrow \) impossible for \( n \) and any \( m > 3 \)

Observe how this entails an impossibility result for all \( n \geq 2 \) and \( m \geq 3 \).

Next: Proofs of (the contrapositives of) the above two lemmas.

Remark: Recall that we had seen in the first session that any resolute SCF that is both surjective and strategyproof must also be Paretian. We will use this fact for the proofs of both lemmas.
**First Lemma**

**Lemma 5** If there exists a resolute SCF for \( n + 1 > 2 \) voters and three alternatives that is surjective, strategyproof, and nondictatorial, then there also exists such a SCF for \( n \) voters and three alternatives.

**Proof:** Let \( A = \{a, b, c\} \) and \( N = \{1, \ldots, n\} \). Now take any resolute SCF \( F : \mathcal{L}(A)^{n+1} \rightarrow A \) that is surjective, SP, and nondictatorial.

For every \( i \in N \), define \( F_i : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \rightarrow A \) via \( F_i(R) = F(R, R_i) \). And check:

- **All** \( F_i \) are **surjective**: Immediate from \( F \) being Paretian. ✓
- **All** \( F_i \) are **SP**: First, no \( j \neq i \) can manipulate, given that \( F \) is SP.
  
  Now suppose voter \( i \) can manipulate in \( R \) using \( R_i' \). Thus, \( i \) prefers \( F(R_{-i}, R_i', R_i') \) to \( F(R_{-i}, R_i, R_i) \). But then \( i \) also must prefer \( F(R_{-i}, R_i', R_i') \) to \( F(R_{-i}, R_i', R_i) \) or \( F(R_{-i}, R_i', R_i) \) to \( F(R_{-i}, R_i, R_i) \).
  
  So \( F \) is manipulable in both cases. Contradiction. ✓
- **At least one** \( F_i \) is **nondictatorial**: If all \( F_i \) are dictatorial, \( F \) must elect the top-choice of voter \( n + 1 \) whenever at least one other voter submits the same ballot. But any such \( F \) is manipulable. Contradiction. ✓
Second Lemma

Lemma 6 If there exists a resolute SCF for \( n \) voters and \( m > 3 \) alternatives that is surjective, strategyproof, and nondictatorial, then there also exists such a SCF for \( n \) voters and three alternatives.

Proof: Let \( m > 3 \) and let \( A = \{a, b, c, a_4, \ldots, a_m\} \). Take any resolute SCF \( F : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \to A \) that is surjective, SP, and nondictatorial.

For any \( R \in \mathcal{L}(\{a, b, c\}) \), let \( R^+ = R(1) \succ R(2) \succ R(3) \succ a_4 \succ \cdots \succ a_m \).

Now define a SCF \( F^{a,b,c} : \mathcal{L}(\{a, b, c\})^n \to \{a, b, c\} \) for three alternatives:

\[
F^{a,b,c}(R_1, \ldots, R_n) = F(R_1^+, \ldots, R_n^+)
\]

\( F^{a,b,c} \) is well-defined (really maps to \( \{a, b, c\} \)) and surjective, because \( F \) is Paretian. \( F^{a,b,c} \) also is immediately seen to be SP.

Done if \( F^{a,b,c} \) is nondictatorial. If not, consider all \( F^{x,y,z} \) for \( x, y, z \in A \).

Done if one of them is nondictatorial. If all are dictatorial, get contradiction: As SP implies independence, if \( F^{a,b,c} \) has dictator \( i \), \( i \) is “local dictator” for \( \{a, b, c\} \) under \( F \). So \( F \) has some local dictator for every triple. But these local dictators cannot be distinct voters, so \( F \) in fact must be dictatorial. \( \checkmark \)
Critique of the Approach

A possible objection to this approach is that proving the lemmas can be quite difficult, almost as difficult as proving the theorem itself.

This is a valid concern. But:

• A successful proof for a special case with small $n$ and $m$ provides strong evidence for (though no formal proof of) a general result. Indeed: The G-S Theorem is surprising. Our lemmas are not at all! Can use this as a heuristic to decide what to investigate further.

• Sometimes it may be possible to prove a general lemma: as long as the axioms involved meet certain conditions, every impossibility established for a small scenario will generalise to all larger ones.
Refinements of the Approach (1)

The approach was originally developed by Tang and Lin (2009) who used it to reprove Arrow’s Theorem and related impossibility results. Since then there have been several refinements of the basic approach:

- General \textit{reduction lemma} that applies to all axioms meeting certain syntactic restrictions. Allows for automated \textit{discovery} (not just verification) of results (Geist and Endriss, 2011).

\textbf{Trivia:} This allowed us to prove 84 impossibility theorems in a space of 20 axioms (by trying all subsets).


**Refinements of the Approach (2)**

Further developments have taken place very recently:

- More *sophisticated encodings* into SAT (Brandt and Geist, 2016).
- Extraction of *minimally unsatisfiable sets* to enable construction of *human-readable proofs* (Brandt and Geist, 2016).
- Extension to SMT solving (*satisfiability modulo theories*). Used to obtain results for probabilistic social choice (Brandl et al., 2018).

---


Summary

This has been an introduction to the application of tools from logic and automated reasoning to the study of social choice.

Our focus has been on a hands-on example: proving the “base case” of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem with a SAT solver.

An approach with lots of potential (but steep learning curve!).

Related work discussed only very briefly:

- *logical modelling* of social choice scenarios using a variety of logics
- verification of known proofs using *interactive theorem provers*
- *formal verification of implementations* of voting rules

For a discussion of the relevance of the SAT solving approach to SCT for Economics, consult Chatterjee and Sen (2014).

Exercises

I encourage you to attempt these exercises (details on course website):

- Use our program to obtain descriptions of all resolute voting rules for \( n = 2 \) and \( m = 3 \) that are strategyproof.
- Prove the Duggan-Schwartz Theorem (generalising the G-S Thm to irresolute rules) for \( n = 2 \) and \( m = 3 \) via SAT solving.